Do Risk Preferences Influence The Decision To Adopt New Technologies? by Kelley, Erin
i	  
 
 
DO RISK PREFERENCES INFLUENCE THE DECISION TO ADOPT NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES? 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
Of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Science  
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Erin Munro Kelley 
August 2013  
ii	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 Erin Munro Kelley 
  
iii	  
ABSTRACT 
This study is set in rural Colombia where potato farmers face an ongoing struggle against the 
Guatemalan Potato Moth.  In 2009, a new technology was devised that was both environmentally friendly 
and efficient at neutralizing this pest.  The present paper seeks to identify the main factors that affect the 
probability of farmers adopting this type of technology.  More specifically, it assesses whether farmers’ 
risk preferences influence their willingness to adopt a new technology. It also gauges the extent to which 
they will adopt.  We find that the main barriers to adoption are the characteristics of the new technologies 
themselves.  Furthermore, while farmers’ risk preferences do not impact their decision to adopt a new 
technology, they do influence the extent to which they will adopt.  
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Section I: Introduction 
I.  Motivation  
Many of the world’s poor rely heavily on agriculture as their main source of revenue.  While this 
can be a lucrative business for some, the majority of smallholder farmers throughout the developing world 
can rarely cover their households’ expenses.  Indeed, they face a complex set of challenges, which include 
difficult and variable weather conditions, limited access to credit, and price volatility among others. 
Furthermore, smallholder farmers are often constrained to use outdated technologies because they lack the 
necessary knowledge and capital to invest in superior techniques.  In the last few decades there has been a 
surge in technological innovations that are specifically designed to help smallholder farmers.   As a result, 
technological innovation is helping to increase farm productivity, thereby fuelling economic growth.  The 
most efficient technologies are able to increase output while protecting the environment and safeguarding 
human health.    
These new technologies present many clear benefits to farmers, and yet adoption rates 
consistently remain low.  Many studies have investigated the reasons behind this (Barrett and Moser, 
2006; Besley and Case, 1994; Conley and Udry, 2010; Croppenstedt, Demeke and Meschi, 2003; Foster 
and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004; Liu, 2012).  They successfully establish that low levels of 
education, credit constraints, insufficient capital and lack of information prevent farmers from testing the 
efficiency of new technologies.   Recently, a growing number of papers have identified two new barriers 
to adoption: farmers’ risk preferences and their interactions with their social network (Liu, 2012; Conley 
and Udry, 2010).   These studies make use complex survey instruments in order to properly identify the 
impact of risk and social networks on the decision to adopt.  In order to precisely estimate a farmer’s 
preference for risk, researchers must make use of experimental games. In these games, farmers are asked 
to choose between various different lotteries.  Some of these lotteries are inherently riskier than others: 
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they yield higher payoffs with less certainty.  Based on the choices they make in the game, farmers are 
then assigned a precise measure of risk aversion.  
The purpose of this paper is to gain a better understanding of how farmers’ risk preferences affect 
their decision to adopt a new technology.   We also hope to determine whether risk preferences impact the 
extent to which farmers adopt.  Most studies measure “extent of adoption” by recording the number of 
acres farmers choose to devote to the new technology, given their decision to adopt. 
II. Purpose of the Study 
The current paper is set in rural Colombia where farmers face an ongoing struggle against an 
aggressive pest known as the Guatemalan potato moth (Tecia Solanivora).  This insect has wiped out 
entire harvests and continuously threatens farmers’ livelihood.   In 2009 entomologists from Cornell 
University, began developing a new technology that presents a number of clear benefits to the farmers: it 
protects their crop yields from the potato moth while reducing crop exposure to harmful pesticides 
(Poveda and Gómez, 2009).  More specifically, this push pull technology combines the use of a garlic 
pepper extract to repel the moths, and rows of trap plants to attract and neutralize the pest.    
The current study’s main goal is to identify which factors will encourage or impede farmers’ 
adoption of similarly innovative technologies.  More specifically, it attempts to further examine whether 
risk preferences will impact the decision to adopt.   As a result, this study contributes broadly to the 
literature on technology adoption, and more specifically to the growing body of work that focuses on the 
role of risk preferences in adoption decisions. 
There are two possible methodologies that could have been used to identify the potential barriers 
to adoption, including risk.  The first method follows the majority of existing papers on technology 
adoption and employs an ex-post approach.   Data is collected after the diffusion of the new technology 
takes place in order to identify the main factors that impeded adoption.  While this approach provides 
interesting economic results, follow up is then required to address these issues if the technology is to reap 
its intended benefits.  This step is rarely completed.  From a policy perspective this is disappointing 
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because time and resources are spent on diffusion and yet adoption rates remain low.  According to 
Barrett and Moser (2006): “for most policymakers and development practitioners wishing to gain insights 
into the adoption process, ex post conclusions are probably not very useful”.  
The second method has only been used in a handful of cases and adopts an ex-ante approach.  
Indeed it identifies the specific factors that have a high probability of the impeding the decision to 
adoption before diffusion takes place.  This approach requires a measure of farmer’s willingness to adopt 
a new technology, because the researcher cannot observe whether the farmer has adopted it or not (as the 
technology is not yet readily available).  Furthermore data needs to be collected on potential barriers to 
adoption.  This includes farmers’ social demographics (wealth, education, age), and their risk preferences, 
among others. This information is then used to statistically predict which factors are most likely to 
increase/reduce the probability that the farmer adopts the new technology in the future.   The findings can 
then be shared with the scientists that are developing the new technology, and the implementing partners 
that would like to diffuse the product.  The former can use this information to alter certain features of the 
new technology and tailor it to the needs of the local farmers. The latter relies on this information to 
address social factors such as wealth, education or risk that might prevent farmers from adopting when 
diffusion actually takes place.  
This paper uses the second approach for two reasons.  Firstly, the entomologists from Cornell 
University that had developed the new technology were still in the process of running their final tests, and 
they were interested in knowing whether or not it would be feasible to implement it among local farmers.  
The answer to this question required a more in depth understanding of the farmers’ needs and preferences.  
The scientists could then use this information to adapt the technology accordingly.  Secondly, we 
established that our implementing partners and government agencies could be more efficient and secure 
higher adoption rates if they were able to identify farmers’ main concerns and limitations beforehand.  
These could then be effectively addressed before diffusion takes place.  
This paper is the first to use this ex-ante approach to specifically analyze the impact of risk 
preferences on the decision to adopt, and the extent to which farmers adopt. The model we select (to be 
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detailed below) explicitly identifies farmers risk preferences as one potential barrier to adoption, among 
others.  The data we collect then allows us to test whether or not risk constitutes a real barrier to adoption, 
and isolate which other factors will encourage/impede the decision to adopt.   
III.  Process 
To this end, we led a two-month field experiment in the summer of 2012 to survey one hundred 
and sixty Colombian farmers in the Department of Cundinamarca (Colombia’s equivalent to a State or 
Province).   We partnered with the National Potato Growers’ Federation (FEDEPAPA by its Spanish 
acronym) whose support was invaluable throughout the data collection process. In order to answer the 
main research questions we needed to characterize each farmer’s willingness to adopt the technology and 
the extent to which they would adopt it.  It was also imperative to collect information on the potential 
barriers of adoption.  
We classify the barriers of adoption into two main groups: attributes of the new technology and 
attributes of the farmer.  Firstly, farmers base their decision to adopt on the characteristics of the new 
technology.  Indeed if they feel the cost is too high or the amount of labor they need to supply is 
excessive, they may choose not to try the new technique.  Secondly, farmers’ personal attributes (social 
factors) might influence their decision to adopt.  These factors include a farmers’ level of education, their 
wealth, their preference for risk and more. Some of these variables were much easier to collect than 
others.  Indeed an entire experimental game had to be designed in order to obtain a measure of risk 
preferences.  
We first define a measure for farmers’ willingness to adopt. We decide to rely mainly on a choice 
experiment (CE), which asks farmers to choose between the status quo technology they currently use and 
a hypothetical alternative that differs with respect to cost, yield, labor and environmental impact.  We 
determine that farmers who switch to the new hypothetical technology have a higher willingness to adopt.  
Different versions of this hypothetical technology are presented to each farmer in order to assess how they 
react to variations in the attributes (cost, yield, labor, environmental protection).   
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We select the CE methodology for two reasons.  Firstly, the technology developed by Poveda and 
Gómez (2009) was still in the process of being tested at the time of the survey.  As a result we deemed it 
more appropriate to measure farmers’ attitudes towards a range of hypothetical technologies that differ 
based on certain attributes.  Secondly, and most importantly, the CE simultaneously provides a measure 
of willingness to adopt, and identifies potential barriers to adoption by teasing out farmers’ attitudes 
towards different attributes of the new technology.   
We then design a contingent valuation question (CV), in order to obtain our measure for “extent 
of adoption”.  The CV asks farmers if they would be willing to rent out a small parcel of their land to 
scientists at Cornell University.  We carefully explain to farmers that these scientists are in the process of 
developing a new, pesticide free technology, that will prevent the Guatemalan Potato moth from 
damaging their crops.  Those who agree to rent their land are then asked how much land they would be 
willing to rent at the chosen price.  We argue that the amount of land farmers are willing to rent to the 
Cornell scientists can be used as a proxy for the amount of land they would be willing to devote to the 
new technology should it become available.  This becomes our measure for “extent of adoption”.  
Finally we needed to collect information on farmers’ personal characteristics, as they constitute 
the second potential barrier to adoption.  We achieve this through the use of a questionnaire and an 
experimental game.  On the one hand, the questionnaire asks farmers about their farming practices and 
various household characteristics.  On the other hand, an experimental game, which borrows its design 
from Tanaka, Nguyen and Camerer (2010), is used to measure farmers’ individual risk preferences.  This 
game presents farmers with a series of pairwise lottery choices and asks them to select their preferred 
lottery.  We choose this game for a number of reasons.  Firstly, the game has several desirable properties.  
Indeed it encourages farmers to answer truthfully because large winnings are at stake.   The game is also 
relatively easy to understand given farmers level of education.  Secondly the game is grounded in 
prospect theory, which is particularly well suited to understanding farmers’ attitudes towards new 
technologies.   More specifically, prospect theory accounts for status quo bias, which is likely to explain 
certain farmers’ behavior. Indeed, some farmers will maintain the status quo rather than switch to 
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something new. This is because they perceive the potential losses from switching to be larger than the 
potential gains.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explain that this cognitive bias stems from individuals’ 
extreme aversion to losses: individuals work harder to avoid losses than to achieve gains.  
There are very few papers that use prospect theory in order to calculate subjects’ risk preferences.  
We are one of the first to derive this measure for risk and then test whether or not it influences the 
decision to adopt a new technology and the extent to which farmers are willing to adopt it. 
IV. Model 
We develop a random utility model in order to determine the primary factors that influence the 
decision to adopt a new technology.  In this model farmers are faced with a choice between two 
technologies.  One represents the status quo and the other is an alternative that differs based on cost, labor 
requirements, yield and health/environmental impact. Farmers derive a specific level of utility from each 
of the two technologies, and will choose the one that provides the highest level of utility. The utility they 
receive from each technology depends on two independent factors: their personal characteristics, 
including risk preferences, and the features of the technologies themselves.  Furthermore we use a 
reduced form equation to estimate the extent to which farmers are willing to adopt a new technique.  This 
econometric approach is based on previous literature that has focused on similar questions (Cooper and 
Keim, 1996; Cooper, 1997; de Janvry and Qaim, 2003; Hubbell et al., 2000).    
Our main hypothesis is that the features of the new technology will influence farmers’ decision to 
adopt, while farmers’ personal characteristics will influence the extent to which they adopt.   This 
hypothesis was formulated after we identified the sample of farmers we would be working with.  Indeed 
our sample consists of Colombian farmers who are affiliated with FEDEPAPA.  These farmers consult 
agronomists on a regular basis and are frequently exposed to new products that can benefit their crops.   
As a result, they are in the habit of weighing a product’s pros and cons before they chose to try it or not.   
It is likely that they will do the same when confronted with new technologies.  Therefore we suspect that 
farmers place a lot of emphasis on the features of the new technologies when deciding whether or not to 
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adopt. Furthermore our sample of farmers has self-selected into this association, which means they 
already place value on being part of a group that promotes best practices in potato farming.  As a result 
we expect that personal characteristics, and particularly their risk preferences, may not be a driving force 
in the adoption decision.   Conversely, we believe that these personal characteristics, and most 
importantly risk preferences, will influence farmers’ decision to invest more or less of their own assets 
into the new technology.  In other words, farmers’ individual attributes, and their tolerance for risk, affect 
the extent to which farmers will adopt rather than the decision to adopt.  
Our results confirm these hypotheses.  Indeed farmers seem to base their decision to adopt solely 
on the features of the new technology.  Moreover, the decision to invest more or less heavily in a new 
technique depends on farmers’ personal characteristics, including their preference for risk.   
V. Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II provides further motivation for the 
project.  It reviews the main challenges facing potato growers in Colombia, and illustrates the need for 
new technologies.  The section concludes with a summary of one such technology currently being 
developed by Cornell University.   Understanding what would motivate a Colombian farmer to adopt this 
type of technology was the primary reason for this study.  Section III provides an extensive review of the 
four different bodies of literature that we used for this study: stated preference methods, technology 
adoption, experimental games, and the impact of risk preferences on technology adoption.  Section IV 
provides an in depth explanation of the data collection process and the survey design.  Section V presents 
the econometric model and Section VI reviews the results.  Section VII concludes and provides some 
suggestions for future research.	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Section II: Background 
I. Colombia Potato Farmers and Their Struggles 
Potato farming represents an important sector of economic activity in Colombia. According to the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Colombia produced approximately 2 million tons of potatoes 
in 2010 (FAO, 2010).  This generated over 306 million dollars, making it the sixth most lucrative crop for 
the country.  Millions of individual Colombians benefit directly from the industry.  Indeed, there are close 
to 90,000 families that cultivate potatoes and thousands more daily laborers that help tend to the land 
(FEDEPAPA, 2007). The majority of potato growers operate small farms (0-3 hectares), which are 
characterized by intensive production per unit of land (Intentional Food and Policy Research Institute 
IFPRI, 2006). These farmers generally use high doses of chemicals and have very little access to high 
tech machinery (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural MADR, 2005). 
Potatoes are cultivated primarily in four of Colombia’s thirty-two departments: Cundinamarca, 
Boyacá, Nariño and Antioquia (Figure 1). In 2011 approximately 131 thousand hectares were planted 
with potato seeds.  This represents close to 16% of Colombia’s arable land devoted to permanent crops 
(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística DANE, 2011).  Potatoes need to be grown in cold 
climates, and the majority of farms are located in the highlands and mountainous regions approximately 
2,000 to 3,500 meters above sea level (FEDEPAPA, 2005).  There are usually two harvest periods each 
year, running from January to March and June to September (MADR, 2005). 
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Figure 1.  Map of Potato Growing Regions in Colombia1  
 
Potato farmers face a growing number of challenges, which include: increases in production 
costs, volatility in selling prices and difficult weather conditions (particularly heavy rains and frost).  The 
following two graphs provide concrete evidence of these economic hardships.  Figure 2 depicts the 
growing production costs for farmers for three different types of potatoes: Pastusa Suprema, Criolla, and 
D. Capiro.   Indeed, potato farming requires large expenditures for fertilizer, insecticides, seed and daily 
laborers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Source: FEDEPAPA. Guia Ambiental Para el Cultivo de la Papa. 2005 
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Figure 2.  Total Costs of Potato Production for Three Different Varieties per Hectare, per Farmer2  
 
Meanwhile farmers are also concerned about an increasingly volatile selling price for their 
potatoes.  Figure 3 depicts this trend for one of the more popular potato varieties in Colombia: la Criolla. 
From one month to the next the price of the potato can rise or drop dramatically.  This trend has persisted 
for the last 5 years (2007-2012).  This makes it particularly difficult for the farmers to predict whether or 
not they will be able to cover their costs.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Source: FEDEPAPA. Annual Review of Costs. 2012 
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Figure 3: Monthly Sales Price (per Kilo) for the Criolla Potato Variety from 2007-20123 
 
The biggest challenge of all for farmers is in the fight against the many diseases that plague the 
potato crop.  There are over 35 common types of pests, fungi, bacteria and virus’ that can affect the health 
and growth of the potato (FEDEPAPA, 2012).  The three major afflictions include: the Andean weevil, 
the late blight fungus, and the Guatemalan potato moth.  Furthermore farmers have to resort to harmful 
pesticides in order to reduce crop destruction. 
The Guatemalan potato (T. Solanivora) moth is one of the most harmful pests to attack potato 
crops in Colombia. It has the ability to destroy entire stocks of potatoes (in the field and in the storage) in 
less than three months by drastically reducing the quality of the tubers (European and Mediterranean 
Plant Protection Organization EPPO, 2005). Potatoes that are infected cannot be sold for human 
consumption and are primarily used to feed the livestock.  As a result, they can only be sold at a fraction 
of their usual market price.   The end result is that farmers incur huge losses, which often prevent them 
from covering their costs.    Furthermore, the pest is very resilient and can survive between cropping 
seasons in any discarded potatoes that remain in the soil after the harvest, and in any potatoes that are held 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Source: Federacion Colombian de Productores de Papa.  Revista Papa. 2012  http://www.fedepapa.com/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/revistas/ed26.pdf 
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in storage (Wale and Cattlin, 2008). This means that a single infestation in one year can also result in the 
destruction of future yields.  
Farmers use a wide range of insecticides to control for the Guatemalan Potato Moth.   Some 
substances are extremely toxic to humans, animals and the environment.  One such pesticide is 
Carbofruan.  The use of Carbofuran is currently banned in Canada, the European Union and most recently 
in the United States (U.S Environmental Protection Agency EPA, 2011). It is highly toxic by inhalation 
and can have the effect of over-stimulating the nervous system causing nausea, dizziness and confusion 
(International Program on Chemical Safety, 2012). This pesticide is also detrimental to the surrounding 
environment, particularly to the animal population. 
More commonly used in Colombia are a second class of insecticides, which are slightly less toxic 
than the first.   In order for the side effects of these substances to remain minimal, adequate protection 
measures must be taken.  This is not always the case in Colombia.  Chlorpyrifos is an example of one 
such pesticide.  The EPA (2011) finds that chlorpyrifos can have negative side effects including muscle 
weakness, intestinal discomfort and fatigue. These effects can generally be prevented if the appropriate 
measures are taken:  respecting a 24-hour waiting period before entering fields where chlorpyrifos have 
been applied, using chemical resistant gloves, chemical resistant shoes plus socks, chemical resistant 
headgear for overhead exposure (Agency For Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 2011).  More often 
than not, Colombian farmers do not follow many of these measures.   Moreover, the farmers’ families 
generally live close to where the potatoes are grown, making them particularly vulnerable to the 
chemicals that are systematically applied to the crops.  
One of the goals of this study is to arrive at a better understanding of Colombian farmers’ attitude 
towards pesticides.  Therefore we also look at pesticide use, protective measures and pesticide related 
illnesses among potato farmers in the department of Cundinamarca, Colombia.  More specifically, 183 
farmers were asked to reveal whether they had suffered pesticide related illnesses in the last five years, 
and to indicate which measures they had taken to protect themselves from these pesticides.   Just over 
75% of farmers have experienced a serious illness in the last five years.  This includes severe headaches, 
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severe nausea, difficulties breathing, and skin irritations.   The most common ailment are headaches 
followed by nausea and respiratory problems.   Most farmers are aware of the health effects that long-
term exposure to pesticides can cause.    
The majority of farmers in the sample use some form of protective measures when applying 
pesticides to their crops.  At first glance the data suggests that farmers are very conscious of using the 
appropriate gear to shield themselves from toxic chemicals.  Nevertheless, this information can be 
misleading.  While close to 85% of farmers use some form of a mask, the majority of farmers only use a 
simple piece of cloth.  According to the International Labor Organization (1991), every mask needs to 
contain a filter, which should be changed regularly.  Farmers must ensure that the mask fully covers their 
nose and mouth. This is especially relevant for Colombian farmers because they apply pesticides by 
means of a lever-operated knapsack sprayer.  These farmers are in such close proximity to the chemicals, 
that insufficient respiratory protection means they are potentially exposed to high dosages of the 
pesticide. 
The ideal type of mask covers the entire face and resembles a gas mask.  Less than 10% of farmers 
in the sample use such a mask.   Furthermore, close to 40% of farmers do not use some form of work 
clothes (coveralls) when they apply pesticides.  Moreover, of the 60% that do report using coveralls, 
many do not take all the necessary precautions to keep these work clothes from coming into contact with 
objects from their daily lives.  For example, it is common for farmers to come into the house for lunch 
during the day wearing the same clothes they sprayed the fields with.  In doing so they inadvertently bring 
the chemicals into their homes.  Finally, less than 15% of farmers in the sample use glasses.  This is an 
extremely important protective measure as some chemicals can cause severe long-term damage to the 
eyes.      
There exist other studies that confirm this fairly relaxed use of preventive measures by Colombian 
farmers.  Most recently, Feola and Binder (2010) surveyed 190 potato farmers in the region of Boyacá in 
order to determine the factors that would encourage the use of protective equipment.  They found that less 
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than 50% of their sample wore some form of facial protection while 41% wore gloves and 23% wore 
specific work clothing.  Finally, less than 3% wore goggles. 
II. Integrated Pest Management and Push-Pull technologies 
The struggle against pests is one that Colombian potato farmer’s share with other farmers across 
the world, and particularly with smallholder farmers in other developing countries.  Common are the 
stories of farmers choosing to use pesticides that are harmful to their health and the environment, in order 
to try to protect their yields. 
In an effort to address this pressing issue, scientists worldwide have made a concerted effort to 
establish new agricultural technologies that are more environmentally friendly and more efficient than 
pesticides.   One such technology is known as integrated pest management (IPM).  IPM requires the use 
of plants and other natural organisms, rather than pesticides, to deal with the insects that attack farmers’ 
crops.   Many scientists have experimented with IPM and its success is well documented (Norris et al., 
2003).  They have established that the technique is well suited to many different environments (Radcliff 
et al., 2009).   More specifically, reports indicate that yield levels are either maintained or significantly 
increased while reducing the use of pesticides and increasing the benefits for the environment and human 
health. 
There are many different types of IPM strategies that control for crop pests and diseases.  One 
application of IPM that has generated very positive responses is the push-pull technique, with 
experiments in Kenya reporting the highest success rates.  The idea behind the push-pull strategy is to 
combine two different types of organic stimuli in order to rid the production crop of a particular harmful 
insect.  The first stimuli, referred to as the push stimuli, drives the pest away from the production crop 
while the pull stimuli attracts the pests and neutralizes it.  The observed increases in maize yields in 
Kenya were dramatic.   Khan et al. (2008) produced an in – depth cost benefit analysis to illustrate the 
benefits of this technique.  They demonstrate how the push pull strategy is economically efficient, 
generates greater yields and provides better returns to land and labor.  
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IPM and more specifically push-pull strategies are highly context-specific.  The particular stimuli 
(traps and repellants) that succeed in one environment are not guaranteed to work in another.  It is critical 
for scientists to understand the exact nature of the pest, and its environment, in order to establish how 
IPM can be correctly administered in that given setting.   Therefore the Kenyan push-pull strategy for 
example can not be directly applied in Colombia with the same results.  Nevertheless, in searching for a 
way to deal with the Guatemalan potato moth, Poveda and Gómez (2009) began designing a new push-
pull strategy for potato crops in Colombia in 2009. They effectively combine the use of a spray repellant 
(a mixture of garlic and pepper extract) and a trap plant (a different variety of potato plant, S. tuberosum 
cv Roja Narino) that successfully neutralizes the moth. The technology presents a number of clear 
benefits to the farmers: it protects their crop yields while reducing their exposure to harmful pesticides 
and preserving the surrounding environment.   At the time of this study Poveda was in the process of 
running some final tests to ensure that the technology was effective under different environmental 
conditions. 
While this new technology is beneficial for a number of reasons, it is unclear whether Colombian 
potato farmers are interested in investing in new agricultural strategies.  Indeed, these technologies may 
involve certain objective and subjective risks, they also may require more time and labor in order to learn 
how to implement them.  For these reasons it becomes important to assess which factors might encourage 
Colombian farmers to adopt these valuable technologies.  In particular, it is worth exploring whether risk 
preferences have an important role to play. 
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Section III: Literature Review 
The previous section provides the main motivation for this study: Colombian farmers are 
struggling in the face of many challenges and could benefit greatly from new technologies that protect 
their yields and reduce the amount of harmful pesticides they have to handle.   Poveda and Gómez (2009) 
discovered one such technology and were in the process of running some final tests at the time of this 
survey.  Our main objective is to understand the factors that will impede the adoption of technologies 
similar to the one developed by Poveda and Gómez (2009).   In particular we are interested in knowing 
whether risk preferences have a role to play.    
We conduct our analysis before this particular technology was ready to be diffused.  As 
mentioned previously, this is done purposefully in order to provide valuable information to scientists and 
policy makers.  The former can use this information to refine the technology based on farmers’ 
preferences, while the latter can try and address any social barriers to adoption.   As a result we need to 
measure farmer’s willingness to adopt and gather enough information on the two primary barriers of 
adoption that we identify, namely features of the new technology and characteristics of the farmer. 
This section goes through the four different bodies of literature that we use to design and structure 
this study. The first part of the section reviews the methodology used to identify stated preferences.  We 
rely on this literature to design the choice experiment (CE) and the contingent valuation (CV) question, 
which provide measures of farmer’s willingness to adopt a new technology, and the extent to which they 
will adopt.  The CE is also used to identify the attributes of a technology that farmers find most attractive. 
We then summarize the literature on technology adoption in order to identify other potential barriers of 
adoption.  This informs the design of the questionnaire which was administered to farmers along with the 
CE.  Thirdly, we devote a section to the small number of studies that specifically determine the influence 
of risk preferences on the decision to adopt.  Finally, we review the literature on experimental games as 
they pertain to risk.  This is necessary to determine the most efficient way of measuring farmers’ risk 
preferences.  
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I. Stated Preference Methods: Willingness to Adopt and Extent of Adoption 
Our approach to answering our primary questions of interests is to draw on different bodies of 
literature from various fields in economics.   Firstly, we provide an overview of the literature concerned 
with stated preference methods.  Indeed, this paper draws heavily from the body of literature that deals 
with Stated Preference (SP) methods.  In SP surveys, researchers present hypothetical questions to their 
subjects in an attempt to infer their preferences for, or the value they place on, certain goods or services.   
These questions require that individuals make tradeoffs between different attributes of the good/service, 
or between the good/service and a particular monetary sum.  
Stated preference methods are valuable for a number of reasons.  Firstly, they provide a unique 
way for economists to estimate preferences for goods and services when markets do not yet exist.  This 
occurs frequently in environmental economics, as researchers try to identify the value humans place on 
wildlife and natural resources. Secondly, SP methods are often the only practical approach for measuring 
preferences over goods or policies prior to their diffusion or implementation. Many government 
institutions for example would like to measure how individuals will respond to a certain policy.   While 
their behavior cannot be monitored directly, the results from an SP experiment can provide some accurate 
predictions about which attributes of the policy will be accepted or rejected.   
The purpose of the following section is to provide an overview of the wide range of SP methods 
employed in the literature. This will then allow us to justify the two measures that were selected to 
evaluate Colombian farmers’ willingness to adopt a new technology and extent of adoption.    	  
A. An overview of Stated Preference Methodology  
The two most prevalent forms of preference elicitation are referred to as contingent valuation and 
choice experiments.  On the one hand, (CV) methods tend to refer to a stand-alone binary choice task, 
which requires that subjects state their preference between the status quo and a single new policy, good or 
service that has some additional benefit, at a greater cost (Carson, 2007).  These costs can be varied in 
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order to map out the subject’s willingness to pay (or accept) for that policy, good or service.  On the other 
hand, CEs present subjects with various sets of competing alternatives that differ based on specific 
attributes.  The respondents are then asked to choose among them, thereby revealing his or her overall 
preferences and the value he or she places on the specific attributes. 4  According to the pioneers of CE, 
CE is simply an extension of CV (Adamowizc et al., 1998). More specifically, while CV methods only 
focus on a choice between a base case and a specific alternative, CEs asks people to choose between 
alternative cases that are described by attributes.   This difference bestows the CE with some unique 
advantages, to be detailed below.  
Before moving onto a more detailed overview of CV questions, CEs and their differences, it is 
worth mentioning that both these structures can be analyzed using a random utility model.  This is the 
model we employ in the current paper as well.  In each case the subjects’ choice of an alternative (yes/no 
in the CV question and one alternative over another for the CE) can be represented as a discrete choice 
between two options.  In this context, each alternative is described by a utility function, which is 
comprised of a deterministic element and a random error (Train, 2009).  The subject chooses a specific 
alternative if the utility they derive from it is greater than the utility they would gain from any other 
choice.  Assumptions regarding the distribution of the error terms then dictate how the probability of 
choosing the “ith” alternative can be estimated (Train, 2009).  
CV questions provide subjects with a detailed description of a policy, good or service.  The 
design of a CV question induces subjects to reveal how much they value the policy, good or service in 
monetary terms.  There exist different forms of CV methods, but by far the most prevalent is the 
dichotomous choice CV (Haab and McConnell, 2004).  Dichotomous choice CVs use a close ended 
format, asking subjects to answer yes or no to questions of the form “Would you be willing to pay/accept 
x dollars for this service/good/policy”.  There are different types of dichotomous choice methods.  The 
single bound (SB) dichotomous choice version asks one question to respondents of the form detailed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It is worth mentioning that CV’s can also be used to value multiple goods and their changes in attributes (e.g., Randall et al. 1974).  
Nevertheless, according to Lusk (2004) they require “cumbersome repeated questions to achieve the same level of complexity”. 
19	  
above.  The SB method used to be heavily used in the literature, but it has been steadily replaced by the 
double bounded dichotomous choice (DB) method.   Indeed, Hanneman et al. (1991) successfully 
demonstrate that the statistical efficiency of the SB model can be improved by asking each subject a 
second question, which depends on their answer to the first.  If respondents answer, “yes” to the first 
question they are offered a higher bid.  Conversely if respondents answer “no” to the first question they 
are offered a lower bid.   Finally some have argued in favor of the one and a half bound dichotomous 
choice method (OOHB). In a second paper Hanneman et al. (2002) show that the OOHB, while slightly 
less efficient than DB, provides consistent estimates, which is not always the case for the DB.   For that 
reason we chose the OOHB model.  
A CE is “a general preference elicitation approach that asks agents to make choices between two 
or more discrete alternatives where at least one attribute of the alternative is systematically varied across 
respondents in such a way that information related to preference parameters of an indirect utility function 
can be inferred” (Carson, 2000).   The most commonly used CEs are sequential and present a series of 
choice sets, where each choice set is made up of two or more alternatives.  We opt to use a binary choice 
question (only two alternatives), which asks farmers to choose between two technologies: the status quo 
and a new hypothetical alternative.  The advantage of including the status quo is that it makes it easier to 
assess changes in welfare.  Indeed, the respondents always have the implicit option of choosing the status 
quo alternative and, as a result, it should also appear formally in the choice set of the CE (Carson, 2000).    
The ideal CE uses a full factorial design, which combines every level of each attribute with every 
level of the other attributes.  Each combination forms an alternative and hence the experiment produces 
every alternative that could possibly arise from the different attributes and their levels.  These designs are 
not always practical in applied research. As the number of attributes and levels increase, the number of 
potential alternatives becomes too large to manage. As a result, the literature has turned to fractional 
factorial designs, which selects a fraction of these alternatives in such a way as provide uncorrelated 
estimates of all main effects (Addelman, 1962). This will be used in the current paper as well.  
20	  
CEs present a number of clear advantages over CV methods.   The reasons detailed below help 
explain why we opt to use the CE over the CV to understand farmers’ willingness to adopt a new 
technology.   Nevertheless we do make use of a CV question in order to investigate the role of risk 
preferences on the extent to which farmers adopt.  This is done for practical reasons that will be detailed 
later in the paper.   
Firstly, CEs typically ask respondents about a sample of events rather than a single event (Boxall 
et al., 1996). This provides the researcher with more detailed information about how subjects will behave 
and make choices under a variety of different circumstances.  Furthermore, in CEs, subjects are 
encouraged to focus on specific attributes of the goods or services rather than on the details of a given 
case (Louviere et al., 2000). The attributes of the CE are laid out in tabular form whereas the details of a 
specific case in the CV are usually described in a paragraph.  As a result, researchers can be sure that the 
subject is focusing on the particular aspects of the commodity that matter the most to the study.  The same 
cannot be accomplished with a CV.  
Secondly, CEs presents some logistical advantages over CV methods.  Indeed CEs are less prone 
to strategic behavior on the part of the subjects (Louviere et al., 2000).  In CE’s subjects must make a 
series of choices one after the other, which makes it harder to follow a specific strategy.  Conversely with 
CVs, the subject might understate their willingness to pay for a good or service in the hopes of seeing its 
price drop.   Furthermore, it is much easier to detect inconsistent behavior in a CE than in a CV question.   
The CE elicits repeated responses from each subject and varies the levels of each attribute; thereby 
allowing researchers to analyze the choices made and make sure they are consistent with one another. 
Most importantly CEs provide detailed information on subjects’ valuation of each attribute and 
the trade-offs they are willing to make between the attributes (Adamowicz et al., 1998).  In the case of 
damages to a particular attribute for example, compensating amounts of other attributes (rather than a 
monetary compensation) can be calculated.  While CV questions can also be used to value multiple goods 
and their changes in attributes (Randall et al. 1974), this can be fairly complicated to achieve. According 
to a number of experts (Adamowicz et al., 1998; Lusk 2004) the CV design would have to ask a large 
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number of questions in order to tease out all the same effects that the CE is able to identify.  It would also 
be difficult to ensure that some degree of orthogonality was maintained in the design. 
B. Application of SPM: Technology Adoption 
Stated preference methods have been widely used in various fields of research including 
transportation, marketing and health.  Nevertheless, there are only a few studies to date that have applied 
SP towards understanding technology adoption in agriculture.  This next section offers an overview of 
this growing body of literature.  It will show how the majority of the papers use dichotomous choice CVs 
(with one exception) in order to estimate farmers’ willingness to pay for a new technology.  Moreover the 
summary will show that most studies use WTP versus WTA measures.  Finally the review will 
distinguish between the papers that include revealed preferences in their models, and those that do not.    
i.  Willingness to Pay (WTP) and Technology Adoption 
The first two papers of interest combine revealed and stated preferences methods in order to 
measure farmers’ attitudes towards a relatively new technology in the cotton industry: BT cotton.  This 
information is then used to construct demand curves for BT Cotton, which depend on the probability of 
adoption and the proportion of land allotted to BT cotton if adopted.5  The proportion of land devoted to 
BT cotton is a reflection of the extent to which farmers are willing to adopt a new technology.    
The first paper by Qaim and de Janvry (2003) examines why adoption rates in Argentina have 
remained so low despite the technology’s many established benefits. The second paper by Hubbell et al. 
(2000) focuses on the cotton industry in the Southeastern regions of the United States and hopes to inform 
policy on how to best expand BT cotton’s use. The sample of farmers in both studies includes adopters 
and non-adopters of BT Cotton. The adopters, having already made their purchases of BT cottonseeds, 
explicitly revealed their preference for the new technology at the market price.  Conversely, the non-
adopters’ preferences were measured via contingent valuation methods.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The demand curve can be predicted as Qd=ASHARE*BTPROP*TOTCOT*ERROR.  ASHARE is a variable that predicts the share of farmers 
likely to adopt BT cotton at different price levels.  This is derived from the WTP model.  BTPROP is the area that adopting farmers would 
cultivate with Bt cotton at the price.  This is estimated using a Heckit model (to correct for the non-random selection bias).  TOTCOT is the total 
cotton area in the country observed in the reference year (Qaim and de Janvry, 2003). 
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Both studies make use of random utility models, to which they apply maximum likelihood 
techniques in order to estimate farmers’ willingness to adopt BT cotton.  Qaim and de Janvry (2003) find 
that farmers' average WTP for BT cotton is less than half the actual market price.  Secondly, the authors 
are able to show that education, information received about BT cotton and land size have a positive effect 
on the probability of adoption, whereas credit constraints, and higher prices for the GM seeds, have a 
negative effect.  Finally, they find that the proportion of land that farmers are willing devote to BT cotton 
depends on the price of the new technology, education levels and cost of insecticides.  Hubbell et al. 
(2000) establish very similar results in the US, although there exists some noteworthy differences.   For 
example, they find that the average WTP in the United States is close to the market price, and higher than 
the WTP in Argentina.  Moreover the authors determine some additional factors influencing adoption, 
which include location in the US, and experience with resistance to conventional pesticides.  Finally, 
Hubbell et al. (2000) show that the price of the new technology, famers’ income and their experience with 
conventional pesticides affect the amount of land farmers devote to the new technique.  	  
The previous studies creatively combine survey data on stated and revealed choices in order to 
better understand farmers’ preferences for a relatively new technology.   While this approach is very 
effective, it cannot be used to understand how smallholder farmers will interact with a new product that 
has yet to be introduced on the market.  The following two studies make use of stated preference methods 
only, in an attempt to tease out farmers’ preferences for new technologies that have yet to arrive on the 
market.   
The first paper by Krishna and Qaim (2007) investigates eggplant producers’ WTP for a new BT 
seed that has yet to be released.  More specifically, the authors use a double bounded dichotomous choice 
model in order to examine how farmers’ WTP will fluctuate depending on market conditions.  The 
authors establish that farmers’ average WTP for a proprietary BT hybrid seed will be four times the price 
of conventional hybrids (due to the seeds’ many attributes). Moreover, the study predicts that when a 
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cheaper BT seed (BT OPV) also hits the market, mean WTP for proprietary BT hybrids will decrease.6  
The paper also identifies the main factors favoring adoption of BT seeds.  These include: high pesticide 
expenditure, cultivating owned (not leased) land, higher income, greater household size, (as a proxy for 
labor availability), greater exposure to pest infestations, and receiving agricultural advice from private 
(rather than government) dealers.7  
The second paper by Kolady and Lesser (2006) also examines WTP for BT hybrid eggplant seeds 
(provided by a private company) versus BT open pollinated variety (OPV) seeds (provided by a public 
institutions) in a different Indian province.    The authors run a slightly different double bounded 
dichotomous choice model to assess WTP for the BT hybrid, and an additional simple open-ended 
question to measure WTP for the BT OPV.8   The main decision framework they present is comprised of 
two dichotomous decisions.  The first decision (already made by farmers) is between conventional hybrid 
seeds and conventional OPV seeds.  The second choice is hypothetical, to be made between BT seeds 
(hybrid and OPV) and non-BT seeds. The authors find similar results to Krishna and Qaim (2007) by 
using a bivariate probit model for estimation.  The resource-limited farmers that already use conventional 
OPV seeds are more likely to adopt BT OPV seeds, while the wealthier, educated, large-scale farmers that 
already use conventional hybrids, will opt for the BT hybrid.  
ii.  Willingness to Accept (WTA) and Technology Adoption 
The previous studies estimated farmers’ willingness to pay for a new technology and predicted 
their likelihood of adoption.  In some cases, however, it might not be useful to calculate WTP.  Indeed 
farmers might be too risk averse or lack sufficient information on the new practice to consider investing 
their time and resources into it.   The important question then becomes whether or not the farmer can be 
incentivized to adopt.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A variation on a choice experiment was used to determine how farmers’ behavior would change under a new market structure, where they are 
faced with three distinct choices: (i) adopting Bt hybrids (produced by the private company), (ii) adopting Bt OPVs (produced by the public 
sector), and (iii) non-adoption of the technology. 
7 There are additional factors motivating the purchase of BT hybrid over BT OPV. The results indicate that BT hybrids caters to larger, more 
wealthy farmers while BT OPV seeds are better suited to poorer farmers with less resources. 
8 The authors also ask farmers to state their preferences directly between BT OPV and BT hybrid if both were available on the market.  
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The following paper by Cooper and Keim (1996) examines the efficiency of a USDA funded 
program that offers 10$ incentives for every new acre that a farmer devotes to environmentally friendly 
production practices. The authors begin by using a double bounded dichotomous choice CV to elicit 
farmers’ willingness to accept.9  Farmers that opted to try the new technology for a certain dollar amount 
were also asked to indicate how many acres they would devote to the new farming practice.  The authors 
use a bivariate probit model to assess the probability of adoption.10 Moreover, a bivariate probit sample 
selection model, and a double hurdle model, are both used to determine what factors affect the decision to 
devote more or less land to the new farming technique.11  The paper finds that farmers are more willing to 
adopt if the amount they will receive from the USDA is higher, and if they invest little time in off-farm 
work.  Moreover farmers with more land, higher net income and less off farm work are willing to devote 
a higher number of acres to the new farming practice.  The authors conclude that it will be very expensive 
to incentivize farmers to switch to a new technology.   At current rates of 10$ only 30% of farmers will 
accept enrollment.  
iii.  Choice Experiments (CE) and Technology Adoption 
The choice experiment is arguably the most appropriate stated preference method to understand 
technology adoption.  It allows researchers to obtain a precise measure of a farmer’s willingness to adopt, 
and simultaneously identify which attributes of the given technology farmers find most attractive.  
Breustedt et al. (2008) design a multinomial choice question in order to explore farmers’ willingness to 
adopt genetically modified oil seed rape in Germany. The authors use a random utility framework, which 
is estimated using a multinomial probit.  They find that the specific attributes of the GM technology 
significantly influence the probability of adoption.  Moreover the authors identify a number of farm and 
farmer characteristics that impact the decision to adopt a new GM technique.   Finally the study presents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The specific question is “if you don’t use this practice currently, would you be adopt the practice if you were given a $[X] payment per acre? 
(answer yes or not)  
10 This accounts for the sample selection bias that may exist.  Indeed, only those survey respondents who had not yet adopted the farming 
practices were asked the CV question.   
11 A double hurdle model is a bivariate probit sample selection model with a tobit structure for the continuous portion 
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demand simulations, which illustrate how sensitive adoption is to the profit margin differences between 
GM and non-GM rape varieties.  
II. Determinants of Technology Adoption: General Overview 
SP methods have been used to establish whether or not individuals will adopt a new technology in 
the future.  They can also be used to identify potential barriers to adoption.  Choice experiments in 
particular help to determine which specific attributes of a given technology will most likely increase the 
probability of adoption.   For example, some farmers will only switch towards a new technology if yields 
are twice as high, while others are content with slightly lower yields if they can be sure that the new 
technique is more environmentally friendly.   This information becomes especially useful to scientists 
who can then adjust the features of the technology based on farmers’ preferences.    
The use of SP methods requires that researchers collect their data before the technology is 
actually diffused (ex-ante).  As we have seen, there are only a handful of studies that use this approach to 
analyze the decision to adopt a new technology.  Indeed, the majority of papers that investigate 
technology adoption do so after diffusion has taken place (ex- post).  The following section reviews this 
large body of works.   The literature is extensive because the decision to adopt a new technology is 
complex.  The choice depends on a number of variables that extend beyond farmers’ attitudes towards the 
specific features of the new technique.   Indeed, the literature has extensively documented the importance 
of social factors.  This includes a farmer’s level of education, their social networks, liquidity/labor 
constraints, and risk.  The following sections summarize the main papers that have explored these factors’ 
impact on technology adoption.  
A. Learning by doing and Learning from others (Networks) 
Within developing countries, the diffusion of new technologies generally takes place at the 
village level.  Farmers begin to discuss the features of the new technique amongst themselves, and some 
will choose to adopt while others will not.  There are two ways to learn about the new technology.  Firstly 
farmers can try the new technique for themselves and gain experience and confidence that they will be 
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able to generate higher yields and profits.  Secondly, as diffusion starts to pick up, the process of learning 
about the new technology becomes increasingly social.  New users learn the characteristics and the 
methods from other adopters in their social network.  There is a growing body of literature that has tried 
to measure the importance of learning by doing, and learning form others, on the decision to adopt.   
The first study to look at the effects of learning on technology adoption was conducted by Besley 
and Case (1994) in India.   They develop dynamic models of learning, where farmers update their 
preferences based on the profits (or losses) they incur from using the technology, and their perceptions of 
the technology’s value.  The models are then used to simulate the various decisions that farmers might 
make in response to the appearance of a new technology.  The study finds that farmers do learn from 
others and that adoption of high performance seeds is correlated with adoption among their neighbors.  
Subsequently, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) assess the relationship between social networks and 
technological change as it pertains to high yielding seed varieties (HYVs). They develop a target input 
model that incorporates learning by doing, as well as learning spillovers from others.  The model is then 
used to derive testable hypotheses about these learning processes among rural farmers in India during the 
Green Revolution. They find that farmers with insufficient information about the new technology are 
much less likely to adopt HYVs.  Secondly, as farmers and their neighbors’ gain more experience with 
the new technology, the likelihood of adopting increases.  Moreover, they begin to derive higher profits 
from using the new technique.  Barrett and Moser (2006) and Conley and Udry (2010) identify two main 
drawbacks with this paper.  Barrett and Moser (2006) criticize the model’s assumption that adoption is 
optimal and that farmers will never dis-adopt.  Conley and Udry (2010) on the other hand illustrate the 
drawback in having to use village aggregates as the relevant information for social learning.  
In the last decade there has been a renewed interest in the effects of social learning on technology 
adoption.  Munshi (2004) develops a model, which illustrates that the effectiveness of social learning 
depends on the diversity of the population.  The study demonstrates that the flow of information is weaker 
in areas where farmers are more heterogeneous, especially when the technology’s performance is 
sensitive to neighbors’ unobserved characteristics.  Furthermore, Bandier and Rasul (2006) analyze social 
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networks and technology adoption in Mozambique.  The novelty of their study resides in the fact that they 
were able to contact farmers precisely when the technology began to be diffused in the region.  This 
allows them to isolate the characteristics of the first adopters, as well as identify whether social networks 
influence the decision to adopt.  They find that farmers are more likely to adopt when they have a few 
other “adopters” in their network.  Conversely if farmers have a network consisting primarily of other 
adopters, they themselves are less likely to adopt (possibly because they chose to free-ride).   Finally 
Barrett and Moser (2006) conduct a study of technology adoption in Madagascar.  This paper will be 
explained in greater detail below.  To summarize briefly, they find that farmers with higher levels of 
education, and greater access to extension agents, are more likely to adopt. Similarly, farmers who belong 
to cooperatives, and thereby interact more frequently with other farmers, are also more likely to adopt.  
Conley and Udry (2010) recently published one of the most influential papers on social learning 
and technology adoption.  Their research is set in Ghana among pineapple growers, a region where new 
technologies re rapidly emerging.  The authors create a unique data set, which maps out each farmer’s 
information network by tracking their communication patterns with others.  Furthermore, the authors 
collect geographical data as well as information on farming characteristics, soil composition and 
household demographics (family relationship and credit access) in order to mitigate the likelihood of 
omitted variable bias.   They find that farmers will increase (decrease) their use of fertilizer if one of their 
neighbor’s had a better than average harvest when they used more (less) fertilizer.   
In this study we also attempt to identify the effects of social networks on the decision to adopt.  
Our measures are very basic though as we are working with cross sectional data.  More specifically, we 
include two variables in the model that exemplify the idea that farmers learn from others.  Indeed, we 
asked farmers whether they sought advice from other farmers and/or extension agents.  
B. Seasonal Liquidity and Labor Constraints 
Another main barrier to adoption includes seasonal liquidity constraints.  This is most 
dramatically illustrated by Barrett and Moser (2006), who analyze the decision to adopt a system of rice 
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intensification (SRI) in Malaysia.  They design a complex model of technology adoption in order to 
understand why adoption rates have remained so low.  The authors also collect recall data in order to 
generate a quasi-panel data set.  Their framework is based on the standard model of inter-temporal utility 
maximization. They subsequently estimate the decision to adopt and the extent of adoption using a probit 
and a tobit model (using Powell’s symmetrically censored least squares estimator), respectively.  The 
paper finds that farmers’ liquidity is a major factor hindering adoption of SRI.   Indeed farmers often run 
out of their supply of rice in the months leading up to the harvest.  In the absence of seasonal credit these 
farmers are constrained to sell their labor and work on neighboring farms in order meet their basic 
subsistence requirements.  As a result households face a shortage of family labor, which then deters them 
from adopting a new technology such as SRI, which requires greater amounts of labor.  
There are a number of other studies that identify credit constraints as a barrier to adoption.  
Croppenstedt, Demeke and Meschi (2003) estimate a double hurdle fertilizer adoption model among 
farmers in Ethiopia. They find that insufficient access to credit is the major supply side barrier to 
adoption.  Furthermore, there are also theoretical models developed by Feder (1980) that highlight the 
negative impact of credit constraints on adoption decisions. More precisely, when credit constraints are 
binding and farmers experience an increase in credit availability, they devote more of their resources to 
the new technology.  
It is unlikely that credit constraints will be of the greatest importance in this study for several 
reasons.  These will be detailed later in the analysis section of the paper.   In general, however, farmers 
have relatively easy access to credit from various financial institutions.   	  
C. Risk 
Finally we provide a detailed overview of the literature that investigates the effects of risk 
preferences on technology adoption.  Because this is the focus of our current paper as well, we dedicate a 
separate section to this review.   
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III. Determinants of Technology Adoption: Risk 
There exists a substantial body of works that investigates the relationship between risk and 
technology adoption.  Some of the studies are rooted in theory while others use experimental games and 
survey questionnaires to specifically measure individuals’ risk preferences and their decisions to adopt.   
The following section provides a brief overview of the most influential papers in the field.  
A. Structural Models of Risk on Technology Adoption	  
Theoretical models have long explored the effects of risk on adoption decisions.  Just, Feder and 
Zilberman (1985) provide a detailed review of the various models that have emerged over the years.  The 
first group of models addresses a scenario in which farmers choose between the traditional technology 
and a modern one.  Hiebert (1974) develops a model of this type.  Assuming that farmers are risk averse, 
he investigates the impact of imperfect information on the decision to adopt.  He uses a stochastic 
production function, and finds that increasing levels of risk aversion induce the farmer to devote less land 
and fertilizer towards the modern crop.  Subsequently, in 1980, Feder presented a new framework.  His 
model is anchored in the assumption that only the new crop has some measure of uncertainty associated 
with it.  Moreover this new crop does not require any additional fixed costs.  Feder also assumes risk 
aversion and makes use of a stochastic production function.   The model predicts the same results for land 
allocation as Hiebert’s.  However, it does not find that fertilizer usage was influenced by risk aversion.  
Later, in 1983, Just and Zilberman built on Feder’s 1980 study. They demonstrate that the decision to 
invest more or less heavily in modern inputs depends on two independent factors.  Firstly it is contingent 
on whether the new technology is risk reducing or risk increasing.  Secondly it depends on whether 
relative risk aversion is increasing or decreasing.   
The models previously discussed are static adoption models, and assume that the farmer has to 
make a single decision between two technologies.  In their review Just, Feder and Zilberman (1985) also 
identify a number of other models that extend beyond this one time decision framework.  Indeed, Feder 
(1982) develops a model where farmers have to decide between the status quo and two modern 
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technologies.  Farmers can choose to adopt one or both of the new technologies.  The model finds that the 
decision to adopt one technology or both depends on different factors, because the technologies involve 
varying amounts of uncertainty and risk.  
Finally, Just, Feder and Zilberman (1985) also present a few studies that use dynamic models.  In 
this framework, farmers update their opinions of the new technology based on their past experiences. 
O'Mara (1971) produces one of the first models to use scientific Bayesian methodology.  In the model, 
producers adjust their beliefs based on the technology’s performance.  Indeed, if producers find that the 
new technology is doing well, they tend to invest more heavily in it.   In other words, the more positive 
experiences these producers have, the more likely they are to increase their extent of adoption.  
Subsequent dynamic models have also included risk preferences.  Linder and Fischer (1981) develop a 
complex Bayesian learning model, which assumes risk aversion.  
B. Experimental Studies of Risk on Technology Adoption (after diffusion) 
Just, Feder and Zilberman’s seminal paper (1985) discusses the various different theoretical 
models of technology adoption that feature risk.   The study also provides a brief review of the empirical 
studies that have investigated the impact of risk preferences on technology adoption.   They acknowledge 
that at the time of publication (1985) only two studies had successfully related risk and technology 
adoption empirically.  This research was conducted by O’Mara (1980) in Mexico and Binswanger (1980) 
in India.  In the last 10 years there have been a few more studies that further investigate this relationship.  
The first studies to analyze the impact of personal risk preferences on the decision to adopt, use 
very broad measures of technology adoption.  Some also use rather basic calculations to estimate farmers’ 
level of risk aversion.  Knight, Sharada and Woldehanna (2003) explore the effects of education on risk 
preferences, and the decision to adopt a new technology.  More specifically, the authors investigate 
whether education impacts the decision to adopt directly, or indirectly through its effect on risk 
preferences.  They measure risk using a single hypothetical question, which asks farmers to choose 
between a safe and risky alternative.  Farmers are then categorized into two groups: those who are risk 
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averse and those who are not.  Furthermore the authors choose a dichotomous measure for technology 
adoption.  If farmers have adopted what the study refers to as an “innovative” input and an “innovative 
crop” they are given a score of one. Conversely if the farmer has only adopted one of these two 
innovations, or none at all, they are given a score of zero.   The study finds that higher levels of education 
decrease risk aversion, while both risk aversion and education directly increase the probability of 
adopting a new technology.    
Warnick, Escobal and Laslzo (2011) use a more complex process to categorize farmers’ risk 
preferences.   Indeed, they use several experimental games, based on Holt and Laury’s (2002) designs, to 
determine farmers risk preferences and their attitude towards ambiguity. 12  The authors then construct a 
portfolio choice model to derive testable predictions about the effect of risk preferences and ambiguity on 
farmers’ decision to diversify the type of crops they cultivate, as well as the varieties of crops they use.  
Turning to the data, they find that farmers who are more averse to risk and ambiguity are less likely to 
diversify they type of crops they harvest.  Moreover, they find that while risk aversion is not statistically 
significant in predicting the decision to try new varieties of a known crop, ambiguity aversion is.  
The previous studies do not focus on a specific technology, and therefore innovation is rather 
arbitrarily defined.  It then becomes difficult to isolate why farmers did not adopt the new technology.  
Indeed it could be that they were risk averse, or it could also be that they believed the technology was 
inefficient.  In this case non-adoption may simply reflect the fact that farmers did not find it profitable to 
try these new techniques.   
Liu (2012) recently conducted one of the most complex empirical studies to examine the 
relationship between risk and technology adoption.  The study examines a group of cotton farmers in rural 
China who must choose between planting traditional cotton seeds or genetically modified, BT cotton 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The distinction between risk and ambiguity is the following.  Adopting a new technology requires taking on some risk because the farmer is 
uncertain about how the new technology will perform.  A farmer is aware of the fact that the new technology may either generate high or low 
yield but they do not know which outcome to expect.  They must be prepared to take on some risk because of this uncertainty.  Ambiguity refers 
to the situation where farmers are unaware of the probabilities associated with the high and low outcomes of the new technology.    Therefore, 
“the uncertainty is about the yield probabilities, in addition to the uncertainty about which state of the world will realize. This is the ambiguity 
case”. 
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seeds.  Over the past ten years some farmers have adopted the new technology (GM seed) while others 
have not.  The author designs a clear model of technology adoption that incorporates farmers’ subjective 
risk in order to test the main hypothesis that risk influences the probability of adopting.  The measure of 
technology adoption that is used is the year in which farmers decided to adopt BT Cotton.  Furthermore 
the study uses a sophisticated experimental game designed by Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010), in 
order to identify farmers’ risk preferences.  These games can also be used to estimate farmers’ aversion to 
losses, and derive a measure for how subjects weight probabilities.  Liu finds that farmers who are more 
loss averse and/or more risk averse adopt Bt cotton later.  Conversely farmers who overweight small 
probabilities tend to adopt Bt cotton earlier. 
Liu’s study is truly innovative.  Nevertheless it suffers from one limitation:  the data is cross 
sectional and the experimental games were conducted after farmers had adopted BT cotton.  Therefore 
these ex-post measures, namely farmers risk preferences, could be affected by the decision to adopt the 
new technology.  This endogeneity problem is hard to correct for given the constraints in the data.   
C. Our approach: Experimental Study of Risk on Technology Adoption (before diffusion) 
This paper ads a new dimension to the literature on risk and technology adoption.  Indeed, it is the 
first study to investigate the impact of risk preferences on farmers’ willingness to adopt a new technology, 
as measured by stated preference methodology.  While there are a few papers that investigate the impact 
of risk on the decision to adopt, this is the first study to do so before the technology is actually diffused.  
One of the reasons for taking an ex-ante approach is to inform policy makers of whether or not individual 
risk preferences will interfere with farmers’ decision to adopt.  Implementing partners can then use this 
information to address farmers concerns before diffusion takes place and thus ensure higher adoption 
rates.  
IV. Eliciting Risk Preferences 
In light of the foregoing review, we will now provide a summary of the literature that investigates 
how to obtain a measure of risk preferences. 	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A. Experimental Games using Expected Utility Theory 
Over the past thirty years, economists have established that experimental games provide the most 
effective way of assessing individuals' attitudes towards risk.13  Moreover, these games are almost 
exclusively grounded in Expected Utility (EU) Theory.  In his seminal paper, Binswanger (1980) 
measures risk attitudes among 240 households in rural India.  The subjects are presented with eight 
different gambles.  Each gamble consists of one high payoff and one low payoff, with equal probability of 
landing on either outcome.   Furthermore, each gamble reflects a different degree of risk aversion.  
Individuals are then given a risk coefficient based on a constant partial risk aversion function.   This exact 
set up is repeated multiple times by increasing or decreasing the level of each payoff in the game by a 
constant factor.  Binswanger finds that for very low payoff levels, there exists a wide distribution in the 
levels of risk aversion.  Nevertheless as payoffs increase in dollar value, the variance of this distribution 
decreases.  Indeed, individuals become progressively more risk averse.   Moreover he finds that wealth 
only slightly influences risk attitudes when payoff levels are low.  
Binswanger’s method represents one possible way of eliciting risk preferences. While this 
technique has its advantages in terms of simplicity, many new methods and game designs have since 
emerged.   A second class of experimental games elicits certainty equivalents for individual lotteries.  
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) ask subjects to write down their minimum selling price for a series of 
proposed lotteries.  These lotteries vary in terms of monetary prizes and win probabilities.  A card with a 
numerical value is then randomly selected from a deck.   Participants are paid the full value of the card if 
the amount is larger than the subjects’ minimum selling price.  Conversely participants will play the 
lottery if the amount on the card is less than their minimum selling price (Becker et al. 1964).14  The 
authors establish that subjects are less risk seeking when monetary prizes increase (increasing relative risk 
aversion).   Furthermore they demonstrate sensitivity to different win probabilities with the presence of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The other approach uses econometric methods to estimate individual risk aversion.  
14 For a more detailed account of how the values on the cards were constructed and how the lottery was plaid please refer to the article by 
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992). 
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“downward curvilinear trend from highly risk seeing to risk neutral/averse preferences as the win 
percentages increase”, which is partially consistent with Prospect Theory. 
The main criticism with this form of elicitation is in the biases it implicitly creates.   The way that 
the pricing task is framed (either in terms of willingness to pay or willingness to accept) can drastically 
affect risk preferences.   Sellers tend to demand much higher prices than purchasers do (WTA>WTP), 
because they do not want to incur a loss (loss aversion).   The low WTP prices reflect risk aversion in 
gains, and the high WTA prices represent risk neutrality or risk seeking in losses.  As a result the 
experimental design creates bias, which leads to inconsistent estimates of individual risk aversion (Holt 
and Laury, 2006).  
Holt and Laury  (2006) develop a third type of experimental game that is most often used in the 
literature.  The fundamental feature of this game is that it is based on pairwise lotteries.  More 
specifically, subjects have to indicate their preference between Lottery A and Lottery B for a series of 10 
paired lottery choices.   The payoffs belonging to the first lottery (A) are less variable than the payoffs 
belonging to the second riskier alternative (B).   Furthermore, the expected payoff difference is initially 
higher for the safe option (A).  Nevertheless for subsequent lottery choices, the probability of winning the 
highest payout in the risky option (B) increases and the lottery produces a higher expected payoff.   
Subjects are asked to indicate the point at which they would switch from the safe Lottery A to the riskier 
Lottery B.   The crossover point from A to B provides an estimate of subjects’ coefficient of relative risk 
aversion.  The game is played a maximum of 4 times with different payoff conditions (the initial low 
payoffs, hypothetical high stakes, real high stakes and a final round identical to the first).  Contrary to the 
notion of constant relative risk aversion, the authors find that risk aversion increases as real payoffs are 
increased.  Conversely they do not detect any significant changes in behavior when subjects are faced 
with higher hypothetical payoffs.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 They conclude by presenting a “power-expo” function that permits the type of increasing relative risk aversion seen in the data. 
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B. Why has Expected Utility Theory Fallen out of favor?  Alternative: Prospect Theory? 
All of these experimental games are rooted in Expected Utility (EU) Theory.   Nevertheless, there 
is mounting theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that EU is not always the best framework to 
use when analyzing individual decision making under risk and uncertainty.  The first major evidence 
against EU theory comes from the Allais Paradoxes, which includes a “common consequence” paradox 
and a “common ratio” paradox (Roth, 1995).  The common consequence paradox demonstrates that 
individuals can make choices that produce indifference curves that are not always parallel.  This violates 
the independence axiom.  Similarly, the common ratio paradox suggests that individuals apply specific 
weights to the probabilities they face in pairwise lotteries.16 This also violates the independence axiom.  
The second major wave of criticism of EU comes from psychological evidence that subjects use 
procedures that are much simpler than EU expects when making their choices.  Furthermore many 
researchers discovered that different forms of elicitations would yield different utility functions (please 
refer to Camerer’s extensive review of individual decision making theory in Roth, 1995).  Finally, in 1982 
Machina compiled some evidence against EU, and came out with new tools for creating economic theory 
without the independence axiom.  
One of the most widely accepted alternatives is known as Prospect Theory (PT), which is 
centered on three cognitive features (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  First is the idea that individuals 
evaluate their options based on some underlying reference point.  More specifically, this reference point is 
used to measure whether gains and/or losses are being incurred.  In other words potential outcomes are 
defined in terms of changes of wealth (i.e. gains and losses) rather than in terms of states of wealth (i.e. 
total wealth).  Framing outcomes in this way then affects how utility is measured.   
Second is the principle of diminishing sensitivity, which applies to both gains and losses.  This 
principle demonstrates that individuals are more sensitive to changes near their reference point than to 
changes that are further from it.  It follows that for larger gains (further from the reference point), an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Drezen Prelec (1998): “it refers to the observation that the more risky of two simple prospects becomes relatively more attractive when the 
probability of winning is reduced by equal proportion in both prospects” 
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individual is much less likely to take a risky gamble that may provide a higher payout, if they have a 
guarantee of receiving a slightly smaller amount.  This notion of diminishing sensitivity can therefore 
explain risk averse behavior in terms of gains.  To describe risk aversion within this framework, 
subjective utility is depicted as a concave function of money: a risky gamble is less attractive than the 
sure thing.  Conversely, diminishing marginal sensitivity explains why individuals behave in a risk-loving 
fashion in terms of losses.  Indeed people would rather select a gamble with a slightly larger loss that is 
merely probably, than incur a sure loss.  To describe risk-seeking behavior within this framework, 
subjective utility is depicted as a convex function of money: a risky gamble is more attractive than the 
sure thing.  
Third is the concept of loss aversion, which says that losses loom larger than gains.  The intuition is 
that “a loss of X$ is more aversive than a gain of X$ is attractive” (Kahneman, 2011).  Therefore in mixed 
gambles where both a gain and a loss are possible, loss aversion causes extremely risk averse choices. 
This can be seen on the utility function at the reference point.  The slope of the utility function changes 
abruptly: the response to losses is much stronger than the response to gains.  
Finally PT also incorporates a non-linear probability weighting function.   The idea is that 
individuals attribute a decision weight to each outcome, which does not correspond linearly to the actual 
likelihood of the outcome (Wakker, 2010).  More specifically individuals have a tendency to overweight 
low probabilities and underweight moderate and high probabilities.  Overweighting of low probabilities 
leads to risk seeking behavior with improbable gains and risk averse behavior with unlikely losses.17  
Conversely underweighting large probabilities leads to risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in losses.18  
The weighting function also behaves inconsistently at the end points (moving from impossibility to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Example: Individuals choosing between 6$ or a 1% chance at 500 will tend to select the gamble because they overweight the probability of a 
1% success rate.  
18 Example: Individuals choosing between 80$ or a 90% chance at 100$ will tend to select the certain option because they underweight the 
probability of a 90% success rate.   
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possibility, and possibility to certainty).  This is because individuals place much higher weights on events 
that are judged to be either certain or impossible.19  
There is a substantial amount of empirical evidence supporting PT over EU theory.  Camerer (2001) 
compiled information on ten phenomena that were consistently detected across different types of field 
data.  He demonstrates how these regularities can only be understood in the context of PT and not EU.   
For example, loss aversion can explain asymmetries in consumers’ reactions to price increases and 
decreases.  Similarly risk-seeking behavior in losses can explain why investors hold on to losing stocks 
for longer periods of time than they hang on to winning ones.20   In summary, Camerer argues that PTs 
major appeal is in its ability to explain both the basic phenomena underlying EU, as well as the many 
anomalies that EU cannot account for.    
Several experimental studies have also demonstrated that individual preferences do indeed depend 
on a reference point (a feature of PT not of EU).  Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) simulate market 
conditions by asking college students to trade goods amongst themselves. They detect what they term an 
“endowment effect”.   This refers to the idea that when a good becomes part of someone’s endowment, he 
or she then perceives its sale as a loss.   Sellers of a good will then demand a higher price than buyers, 
because losses are weighted more heavily than gains.    The authors find that this manifestation of loss 
aversion can explain under-trading in certain markets. 
List (2003) establishes the presence of an endowment effect when he studies real markets for two 
distinct goods. Moreover, he is also able to show that the endowment effect disappears (and subjects 
behave according to neoclassical theory), when individuals’ market experience increases.    Finally, Fehr 
and Goethe (1997) examine the behavior of workers in response to a fully anticipated wage increase. The 
authors find that total labor supply increases, while the effort levels decrease during each shift.  The 
authors conclude that this phenomenon is most accurately explained via a target reference income model 
with loss averse preferences.  Indeed workers earning higher wages will move above their reference 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This explains the attractiveness of lottery tickets (going from 0 to 1% chance at 1 million) and insurance policies (going from 98 to 100% 
coverage). 
20 For a full list of regularities that can only be explained by PT please refer to his paper.  
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target income and start experiencing decreasing marginal utility of income, which, in turn, will induce 
them towards providing less effort. 
C. Experimental Games using Prospect Theory 
There are only a handful of papers to date that have designed experimental games using prospect 
theory. The first paper by Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) carefully constructs three series of 
pairwise lottery choices so that any combination of choices determines a particular set of prospect theory 
parameter values.  These parameter values (risk aversion, loss aversion and nonlinear probability 
weighting) jointly determine the shape of the utility function.  The authors run the experiment in Vietnam 
and successfully estimate each participant’s parameter values.  Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) 
demonstrate that risk preferences are a function of age, education and income while loss depends heavily 
on income.  Furthermore this particular game reduces to EU for certain parameter values.   Nevertheless, 
given the data they collect, the authors are also able to reject the EU in favor of Prospect Theory. This 
game will be explained in greater detail in the following section.  
Liu (2012) runs the exact same experiment in China and comes to very similar conclusions.  She 
demonstrates that risk depends on gender and wealth while loss aversion is influenced by education and 
the degree of income diversification.  She too finds that the EU model can be rejected in favor of PT.  
This experimental game is used in the current paper as well.   As a result we are one of the first 
papers to use prospect theory to measure farmers’ risk preferences.  Furthermore this is one of the first 
papers to use this measure of risk to establish whether or not risk preferences impact willingness to adopt 
a new technology (before diffusion actually takes place).  
 
V. Contributions of the Current Paper 
This paper draws from many different bodies of literature.   The first set of papers that we 
examine follow an ex-ante approach and conduct their analysis before the technology is diffused within a 
community.   They make use of SP methods to determine farmers’ willingness to adopt a new technology, 
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and to isolate the factors that would most likely increase adoption rates.  The second set of papers follow 
an ex-post approach and collect their data after the technology has already been diffused.   These studies 
base their analysis on observed behavior, and are able to identify various factors that are responsible for 
low adoption rates.  Furthermore, some of these papers specifically choose to investigate the effect of risk 
preferences on the decision to adopt. 
This paper is the first to use the ex-ante approach to specifically analyze the impact of risk 
preferences on farmers’ willingness to adopt.   We use a choice experiment to measure willingness to 
adopt, and a unique experimental risk game, rooted in prospect theory, to estimate farmers’ risk 
preferences.   As we have seen, there are a number of papers that use the ex-ante approach to understand 
technology adoption, but they all fail to include a measure of individual risk preferences.  Similarly there 
are a number of studies that analyze the impact of risk preferences, but they all do so after the technology 
has been diffused.  
As mentioned previously, the main benefit of our approach is that it allows us to provide third 
parties, namely scientists and implementing partners, with valuable information that can be used to 
increase adoption rates.  More specifically, by determining whether risk preferences affect farmers’ 
willingness to adopt, implementing partners can either choose to invest in risk coping mechanisms before 
diffusion takes place or not.  
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Section IV: Design of the Study and Descriptive Statistics 
I.  Main Goal of the Survey Procedure 
This paper seeks to identify the main factors affecting the probability that Colombian farmers will 
adopt a new technology similar to the push-pull technique by Poveda and Gómez (2009).  More 
specifically, we investigate whether higher levels of risk aversion will reduce farmers’ initial willingness 
to adopt, and the extent to which they will adopt the new technology.   In order to answer these research 
questions, a detailed data collection process took place during the summer months from June to August 
2012.   
The survey process was designed with two specific goals in mind.  The first was to obtain a 
precise measure of farmers’ willingness to adopt a new technology.   To this end, we constructed two-
stated preference games, a choice experiment (CE) and a contingent valuation (CV) question, in order to 
estimate the probability that each farmer would adopt, and the extent to which they would adopt the new 
technology.   
The second objective was to collect data on every potential barrier to adoption.  These barriers 
can be categorized into two groups: attributes of the new technology and characteristics of the farmer.    
Indeed the farmer first bases his or her decision to adopt on the features of the new technology.   If certain 
characteristics of the new technique are unappealing to the farmer, he or she may choose not to adopt.  
For example, if the technology is labor intensive and the farmer is averse to supplying more labor, then he 
or she may decide not to try it.   As a result, it is important to understand farmers’ preferences towards 
these various attributes.  The CE was used to successfully estimate farmers’ attitudes towards four 
specific features of the new technology.  Secondly, the farmer’s decision will also depend on his or her 
wealth, age, education, risk preferences and other social factors.   A questionnaire and an experimental 
game were constructed in order to obtain the necessary information.     
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II. The Survey Procedure  
The objective of the study is to identify the potential barriers to adoption for potato farmers in 
Colombia, with a specific emphasis on the impact of risk preferences on adoption decisions.  To this end 
we collected data from 184 farmers in six different villages in the Department of Cundinamarca, 
Colombia.  The data collection process was conducted in partnership with the National Potato Growers’ 
Federation known as FEDEPAPA during the months of July and August 2012.   
FEDEPAPA is a privately run institution that focuses on capacity building and training initiatives 
among Colombian potato growers.   Their highly qualified team of agronomists visits farmers on a 
monthly basis in order to assess the health of the farmers’ crops, and diagnose any pest or fungal 
problems that may have damaged the plant.   The agronomists then make specific recommendations to the 
farmers that help ensure healthier crop development and higher yields.  The association also organizes 
weekly and monthly general assemblies, inviting farmers to share their experiences and their concerns.  
These meetings also provide a platform for FEDEPAPA to teach best practices and introduce new 
techniques in the domain of potato farming.  Finally, FEDEPAPA runs a number of independent agro-
chemical stores that sell a wide range of useful products to farmers.  The staff is well trained, and 
provides valuable advice to the farmers when they make their purchases.  
The data collection process was conducted in two specific regions of Colombia.  These locations 
were selected with the help of our collaborators at FEDEPAPA.   The first area is located to the North 
East of Bogota and the second lies to the south of the capital.  These regions are known for producing 
high quantities of potatoes.  Surveys were administered in nine villages from the first northern region and 
4 villages from the second southern region.  We elected these particular villages for two main reasons.  
Firstly they were easily accessible from Bogota.  The furthest village was approximately two hours away 
by car.  Secondly FEDEPAPA operated within each one of these villages and had established direct ties 
with the community of potato farmers.  
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At the very beginning of June, the research team met with the agronomists from FEDEPAPA that 
worked in the villages of interest.  We explained to them the purpose of the project, and reviewed our 
expectations in terms of the data collection process.  These agronomists provided valuable suggestions 
and became instrumental to the project’s successful implementation in the field.   They first began by 
notifying the farmers about the study a few weeks before data collection was scheduled to take place.  A 
second reminder was also sent out a few days before the team of interviewers was scheduled to arrive.  
The agronomists would generally coordinate with the village head to ensure that 10-20 farmers would 
show up for the interviews.  The agronomists made it very clear that we were an independent research 
group trying to gain a better understanding of the challenges farmers face, and a better sense of their 
preferences for different types of technologies.  
The data collection process was organized largely the same way within each village.  A research 
group consisting of the five to eight enumerators would travel by car to the village alongside an 
agronomist from FEDEPAPA.  The surveys were generally conducted in a public building (school or 
community center) and lasted the better part of the morning.  Farmers were invited to come at 9:00 am 
and the activities would begin at 9:30 am with a brief presentation about the purpose of the project.  We 
emphasized many times over that we were an independent research group, and that any information 
provided to the enumerators would remain confidential.   
The sessions were broken up into two sections.  The first section was a one-on-one interview with 
an enumerator and lasted approximately one hour.  The second section was a group activity and took an 
additional hour to complete.   Once the farmers finished both sections, a complementary lunch was 
served.  The farmers also received one third of a day’s wage on average.  
The first section consisted of two stated preference activities (a CE and a CV question) and a 
separate questionnaire.  The CE asked farmers to choose between the status quo technology they currently 
use and a series of alternative technologies that differed based on yield, health risk, cost and work load.   
This activity was used to estimate farmers’ willingness to adopt.  It also served to gather information on 
the first barrier of adoption: attributes of the new technology.  The contingent valuation question asked 
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farmers how much land they would be willing to rent to a University such as Cornell that wanted to test 
the effectiveness of a new pesticide free technology on a parcel of their land.  This question was framed 
specifically to measure the extent to which farmers were willing to adopt.  Finally, the questionnaire, 
which took 40 minutes to complete, asked farmers about household characteristics and farming practices.  
As mentioned previously this questionnaire was designed to collect information on the second potential 
barrier to adoption, namely farmer characteristics.  
The second section brought farmers together to play an experimental game.  This game, borrowed 
from Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010), was designed to measure farmers’ risk preferences.  Indeed, a 
farmer’s attitude towards risk constitutes another potential barrier to adoption.   Those who are more risk 
averse may decide that they do not want to try a new, and unfamiliar, technology.  The game, detailed 
below, took approximately 30 minutes to explain and 30 minutes to play.  It asked farmers to choose 
between three series of pairwise lotteries.  Farmers played for real money. 
III. Experimental Design: Choice Experiment, Contingent Valuation and Risk Game 
 The following section provides a detailed description of the four different survey instruments we 
use to collect the necessary data.  We first present how we construct the CE and CV question in order to 
measure farmers’ willingness to adopt and extent of adoption.  The CE also provides information on 
farmers’ attitudes towards the first barrier to adoption, namely the features of the new technology.  Then 
we describe the two tools we use to gather information on farmers’ personal characteristics, which 
constitute the second barrier to adoption.  This includes both a questionnaire and an experimental game.  
A. Measuring Willingness to Adopt and Extent of Adoption 
The literature identifies two decisions that farmers must make when faced with a new technology.  
Firstly, the farmer needs to elect whether or not they will adopt the new technology.  Secondly, the 
adopters must decide how many acres of their land they will devote to the new technology.  These two 
decisions are generally related.  The factors that encourage adoption tend to be the same as those that 
incite farmers to devote more of their land to the new technology.  
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These two decisions can be observed after the technology is diffused.  They can also be inferred 
beforehand by assessing farmers’ hypothetical choices under certain specific scenarios, which are 
carefully designed by the researcher.  The former has been done extensively in the literature while the 
later remains underutilized.  The advantage of the “ex-ante” approach is that it allows economists to 
gather valuable information about the factors that will encourage and impede adoption.  Indeed, it reveals 
which factors are most likely to affect the probability of adopting in the future.  This information is then 
be provided to scientists who can alter the technology accordingly, as well as to policy makers who can 
attempt to address farmers concerns before diffusion takes place.   
i.  The Choice Experiment: Willingness to Adopt 
The first decision about whether or not to adopt is modeled using a choice experiment.   We use 
this approach because it allows us to simultaneously measure farmers’ willingness to adopt a new 
technology, and their attitudes towards different attributes that a new technology might possess.   This is 
particularly important for this study because we hypothesize that the features of a new technology 
constitute one potential barrier to adoption.  Furthermore, the choice experiment is useful from a practical 
perspective.  Indeed the technology developed by Poveda and Gómez (2009) was not yet finalized when 
the survey was being administered.  As a result we deemed it more appropriate to measure farmers’ 
attitudes towards technologies that differed based on certain attributes.  
We ask farmers to choose between two different technologies for dealing with the Guatemalan 
potato moth.  These technologies differ based on four specific attributes: yield, labor requirements, cost 
and health/environmental impact.   We successfully determined that these four attributes would have the 
largest impact on farmers’ decisions to adopt.  This was established after multiple discussions with the 
agronomists from FEDEPAPA and the farmers themselves.  Furthermore, we wanted to keep the number 
of attributes as low as possible so that farmers would not get lost in the descriptions of each technology.  
The choice experiment exercise was pre-tested, and respondents were asked about their understanding of 
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the terms and whether they felt they could meaningfully evaluate the different technologies based on the 
attributes we had selected.  
Each choice set pits a single technology against the current technology (status quo).  This design 
is selected for four reasons.   Firstly, the CE is made more realistic by including the status quo.  Indeed, 
when making their decisions, farmers always have the option to maintain current practices.  Secondly, 
having two or more non-status quo options decreases efficiency because we need to consider all possible 
combinations (and correlations) between the levels of attributes of the two alternative options.   Thirdly, it 
also hurts the theoretical properties of the elicitation mechanism.  In a recent paper, Vossler et al. (2010) 
restricted their analysis to a binary CE, which asked participants to select between one public project and 
the status quo.  They argue, along with Carson and Groves (2007), that choice experiments including 
more than three alternatives must satisfy many more assumption in order for incentive compatibility to 
hold.  Finally, it allows us to address the idea that risk aversion might influence the decision to adopt.  
Indeed it is often the case that respondents prefer the status quo because they do not want to take a risk 
with something new. This particular elicitation mechanism lends itself to an identification of risk 
aversion.   
We then carefully select the various levels that each attribute can take.  We first determine the 
baseline levels from FEDEPAPA’s records on the average yield, cost, labor requirements and health 
impact of the status quo technology. Average yield is approximately 250 cargas per hectare per harvest 
and average cost is 375,000 Colombian pesos per hectare for a single harvest.21  We define labor 
requirements and environmental impact qualitatively.  The baseline amount of labor is “Same amount of 
labor as the status quo” while the baseline environmental/ health impact is “negative impact on health/ the 
environment”.    We decide to use qualitative descriptions instead of quantitative ones because the 
farmers often describe the health impact of a technology, or the labor it requires, in qualitative terms.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 One US dollar is equal to 1,800 Colombian pesos.  Therefore 375,000 Colombian pesos is approximately 205 US dollars.  Furthermore one 
“carga” is equal to 100 kilograms.  Therefore 250 cargas is approximately equal to 25,000 kilograms.  
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During the pre-test we tried to quantify health/environmental impacts and labor requirements using 
numerical values, but the farmers quickly indicated that this was confusing and misleading.  
We then select one or two additional levels that each attribute can take, which differ from the 
baseline values.   The different levels have to satisfy three criteria.  Firstly, they need to resemble 
potential values that the new push-pull technology might require/produce.  Indeed the goal of the study is 
to determine whether or not farmers are interested in new technologies similar to the one being developed 
by Poveda and Gómez.  Secondly the levels need to straddle the baseline values.  It is important to have 
upper and lower bounds for each attribute, so we can observe how farmers react to positive and negative 
changes in the attribute.  Finally, we avoid selecting extreme levels for each attribute.  We re able to use 
FEDEPAPA’s yearly records, which document changes in yield and cost, to ensure that our chosen levels 
are appropriate and not too extreme.  Indeed, selecting extreme levels would have meant presenting 
farmers with new technologies that demanded drastic changes in current practices.  This is unappealing 
because farmers are unlikely to adopt these types of technologies under any circumstances.  Moreover, 
Hensher et al. (2005) and Carson and Groves (2007) argue that subjects might not be able to relate to 
alternatives that differ substantially from the status quo.  
As a result, the attributes ‘cost’ and ‘yield’ are given 3 different numerical values.  The labor 
requirements are also assigned three levels but they are qualitative in nature.  The technology will either 
require the “Same amount of Labour”, “More Labour” or “Less Labour” than the status quo. Finally two 
levels are selected for the environmental/health factor.  These were either: “negative environmental/ 
health impact” or “positive environmental/ health impact”.  
In this study we use a fractional instead of a complete factorial design, even though the latter 
presents a greater number of statistical advantages.  Indeed, the complete factorial guarantees that all 
attribute effects of interest are truly independent (Louviere et al., 2000).  While this is very attractive, in 
this study the full factorial would have required 3x3x3x2=54 different choice sets.  It would have been 
impossible to present each farmer with the full set of choices. Therefore we reduce the total number of 
unique sets by generating a fractional factorial design.  More specifically we use an orthogonal array, in 
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which all estimable main effects are uncorrelated.  To this end we employ the SAS macro %mktex, which 
produces an optimal design that is both orthogonal and balanced, and therefore also has maximum 
efficiency (Kuhfeld, 2010).  This produces 18 unique choice sets and the resulting D-efficiency, A- 
efficiency and G-efficiency are all 100 percent.22 Furthermore all canonical correlations on the diagonal 
are zero, which tells us that the design is orthogonal i.e., that every factor is uncorrelated with every other 
factor (Kuhfeld 1994, 2010). Finally the design has perfect balance, which means that each level occurs 
equally often within each factor, and the intercept is orthogonal to each effect.   
We determine that it would still be too time consuming to present each farmer with 18 choice 
sets.  Therefore these 18 choice sets are further split into two blocks and participants are randomly 
assigned one of the two blocks in the experiment.  As a result exactly half the subjects receive the first 
block and the other half receive the second.   Table 1 illustrates how the two technologies were presented 
to farmers.  Please refer to the Appendix 2 for the entire CE as it was presented to farmers.   
 
  Technology A (Status Quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield  270 cargas/hectare 270 cargas/hectare 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  More labor  
Cost  375,000 pesos 450,000 pesos 
Health/ Environmental 
Impact 
High probability of developing 
an illness 
Low probability of developing 
an illness 
 I choose: (mark with an X)   
 
Table 1: Choice Experiment (One Choice Set out of Nine) 
 
The Choice Experiment was administered along with the questionnaire.  Farmers went through 
each choice set with the enumerator, who would stress the importance of answering truthfully.   It was 
critical that farmers understand that any information they provided would be passed along to scientists, 
who could then devise more appropriate technologies.  Indeed, previous research by Vossler et al. (2010), 
and Carson and Groves (2007) finds that discrete choice experiments are incentive compatible when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A-efficiency is a function of the arithmetic mean of the eigenvalues of (X′X)−1. D-efficiency is a function of the geometric mean of the 
eigenvalues of (X′X)−1, G-efficiency, is based on, the maximum standard error for prediction over the candidate set. 
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subjects believe their answers will have an impact on future policy outcomes.  This condition is known as 
consequentiality.  
Finally, we examine the set of choices farmers make in a random utility framework.   The choices 
are assumed to be independent.  They are based on the utility that the farmer derives from each 
technology in a set of two alternatives: a new technology and the status quo. The full model will be 
detailed below in the following section.  Nevertheless it is worth mentioning that it successfully allows us 
to determine which attributes of the new technology (e.g. more yield or less labor) increase the probability 
that a farmer adopts.   
ii.  The Contingent Valuation Question: Extent of Adoption 
The second main objective is to establish the extent to which farmers are willing to adopt the new 
technology.  To this end, we design a one-and-a-half bound model for the discrete choice contingent 
valuation method.   We ask farmers whether or not they would be willing to rent a parcel of their land at a 
proposed price to a team of scientists from Cornell University.  We explain that the scientists will be 
using the land for an entire cropping season (4-6 months) in order to test the effectiveness of a new 
pesticide free technology on the potato crop.  If farmers are willing to accept the dollar amount, they are 
also asked to disclose the amount of land they would be willing to rent at that price.   While the scientists 
only need ¼ of a hectare, more land is always better in order to test the efficiency of the product on larger 
parcels. We use farmers’ answer to this second question as a proxy for the amount of land farmers intend 
to devote to a new technology.  Indeed, if farmers instinctively devote more land to a trial then we assume 
they would also allocate more land to a new technology if it were offered.  Therefore we use this as our 
measure of extent of adoption, given that farmers have expressed a desire to adopt.  
We choose to use a CV instead of a CE to investigate the extent of adoption for practical reasons.  
If we had used the CE, we would have had to ask farmers if they were willing to rent their land for each 
one of the new technologies being offered, and how much land they would rent at the agreed upon price.  
This would have been very time consuming.  Moreover it may have confused the farmer who would 
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likely have answered similarly after each choice set was presented. Therefore the CV question is deemed 
more appropriate.   
Furthermore, we could have chosen to frame the CV question as a “willingness to accept” or 
“willingness to pay” question.  We choose the former for two reasons.  Firstly, local agronomists had 
indicated to us that farmers would only try a new, pesticide free, technology if they were given some 
financial incentive to do so.   This idea of using incentive payment programs to encourage the use of new 
environmentally friendly practices is not new.  In 1990 USDA initiated the Water Quality Incentive 
Program that supplied technical assistance and monetary payments to farmers who agreed to implement 
better agricultural practices.  Cooper and Keim (1996) then used a WTA measure in order to determine 
the exact amount the program would need to pay out in order to entice farmers to adopt these new 
practices. Secondly, we choose to use a WTA question because previous research discourages the use of 
WTP measures when dealing with private goods.  Carson and Groves (2007) argue that subjects have an 
incentive to behave strategically and answer, “yes” to such questions.  A “yes” response encourages the 
production of the good and lets the agent decide later whether or not to purchase it.	   Conversely, in the 
WTA game we designed, there are no obvious incentives to answer in the affirmative and then to rent out 
more land.  
There are many ways we could have worded the specific WTA question for the purposes of this 
study.  The most straight forward method would have been to follow Cooper and Keim (1996) and ask 
farmers how much money they would be willing to accept in exchange for adopting the new technology.   
The problem with this approach is that we are not working with a specific technology in mind.  While the 
entomologists at Cornell were in the process of developing a new push pull technique, they were still 
running the final tests at the time of the study.   Moreover, we do not want implement the game using a 
fictitious technology.  Therefore we decide to frame the question as the amount of land farmers are 
willing to rent to an institution that wants to test the efficiency of a new technology.  We deem this to be a 
good proxy for the amount of land farmers will agree to allocate to a new technology, should it become 
available.  
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Finally we choose to use a one-and-a-half bound approach (OOHB) rather than a single (SB) or 
double bounded (DB) method.  Most of the literature uses the DB approach because the estimates it 
produces are more efficient than the estimates derived from an SB.  Hanemann and Kanninen (1991) 
demonstrate this property both analytically and empirically.   Nevertheless there is mounting evidence 
against the DB model as studies have found the subjects’ answer to the second price is often inconsistent 
with their answer to the first.23   As a result we opt for the OOHB model, which Hanemann et al. (2001) 
test analytically and empirically.   They find that the move from SB to OOHB captures two thirds of the 
gains in efficiency associated with moving from SB to DB.  Moreover they find that the OOHB estimates 
are consistent while the DB estimates may not be.   
Before moving on to the next phase of the data collection process, it is worth mentioning that the 
CV could also have been used instead of the CE to identify the factors that impact adoption (i.e. the first 
decision farmers must make when they are faced with a new technology).    Nevertheless we choose to 
use the CE for a number of reasons.  Firstly, the CV question asks farmers whether or not they are willing 
to rent a parcel of their land to an institution for experimental trials.   We believe that a farmer’s 
willingness to rent out their land is a less precise proxy for their decision to adopt a new technology.  
Secondly, the CE boasts many statistical advantages, and also allows us to determine which attributes of 
the new technology farmers find most attractive.  The full extent of these advantages was reviewed in the 
literature review.  
B. Measuring Barriers to Adoption 
The choice experiment and the contingent valuation method successfully provide measures of 
farmers’ willingness to adopt, and extent of adoption.  Furthermore, the choice experiment has the added 
benefit of supplying valuable information on the first potential barrier to adoption: attributes of the given 
technology.  Indeed farmers’ responses to the choice experiment demonstrate how changes in attribute 
levels impact the probability of adopting.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Hanemman (1991), McFadden and Leonard (1993), Cameron and Quiggin (1994), Kanninen (1995), Herriges and Shogren 1996), DeShazo 
(2000) 
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Next we collect information on the second main barrier to adoption: the social characteristics of 
the farmers.  This includes features such as wealth, education, age and risk among others.  The 
measurement of risk is detailed in the following section, as it required a separate experimental design. 
i.  Survey: Personal Characteristics 
The information on social attributes is collected primarily through the use of a questionnaire, 
which includes five main sections.   The sections cover family demographics, farming characteristics, 
household finances (income, saving and credit), household shocks, and social networks. Please refer to 
Appendix 1 to see a copy of the questionnaire that was used to collect this information. 
While we ask a large number of questions, we are most interested in farmers’ levels of education, 
age, gender, relationship to household head, total farm size, access to social networks and wealth.   We 
simply ask farmers their age, gender, education, farm size and relationship to household head.  Moreover, 
we use a contemporaneous measure for social networks: do you take advice from other farmers and/ or 
extension agents?  This is the most accurate depiction of social networks that we could achieve without a 
panel data set. 
We also determine that ownership of durable goods is a good proxy for wealth.  While we were 
hoping to be able to use family income, it proved to be very difficult to obtain a precise measure for two 
reasons.  Firstly, many Colombian potato farmers do not keep exact records of sales and expenditures.  
Therefore, they cannot be sure of how much they make in any given year.  Secondly, some farmers do not 
want to draw any attention, and drastically understate their yearly earnings.  Indeed, they are hesitant to 
reply truthfully because they fear this information will be leaked to the government, who could then 
charge them higher taxes.  We also consider using savings, loans or expenditures as proxies, but these 
prove to be problematic as well.  Firstly, we find that most Colombian farmers do not accumulate savings.  
The money that is left over after a harvest is almost always reinvested in cattle or farm assets.  While we 
try to quantify these amounts we are not often successful, as farmers will dramatically understated the 
amount. Secondly, we find that the size of the loans taken by a household do not correlate with their 
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wealth.  Many well off households take out very large loans to sustain the high levels of agricultural 
production on their farms.  Conversely some very poor households also have to take out large loans in 
order to cover their expenses.   Finally, we cannot use family expenditures because most of our subjects 
are males, and do not have a good sense of how much their wives spend on different household items. 
Our proxy for wealth is carefully calculated for each individual farmer.  We present farmers with 
a list of ten different durable goods and ask them to indicate which ones they own.  This list includes: 
cars, motorcycles, bicycles, radios, televisions, washers, refrigerators, computers or cameras, tractors and 
large machinery.  Farmers are also asked to provide a dollar amount for each of asset they owned.  The 
variable for wealth is then calculated by summing up the dollar value of all the farmer’s assets.  
The following table (Table 2) provides the summary statistics for these key variables of interest 
and a few additional ones.  These supplementary statistics are important as well because they help to paint 
a more detailed picture of the local farming community we are working with.  
On average, the interviewee is forty-two years old and belongs to a household with three other 
members.  The majority of farmers we interview are also male with primary levels of education 
(approximately seven years). Furthermore, most of the interviewees are heads of household.  Indeed, 70% 
of respondents identified their household status as “head of household”.  The remaining 30% are evenly 
split between spouses and sons/daughters of the household head.  Finally, farmers’ level of wealth varies 
greatly within this sample.  The median level of wealth (as measured by the total value of farmers’ 
durable goods) is approximately 1,800 American dollars while the mean is $5,000.  Moreover, the 
interquartile range shows that wealth fluctuates between $500 for the poorest households and $9,000 for 
the richest.  
Additionally, the majority (almost 80%) of farmers who participate in the study have devoted 
their entire lives to agriculture and farming potatoes.  Most are either members of FEDEPAPA, or 
informally consult the association about their crops.  More specifically, approximately 75% of farmers 
report a membership status, while 82% have received advice from FEPEPAPA in some capacity over the 
last 6 months.   Only 8% of the sample does not interact with FEDEPAPA at all.   Furthermore, many 
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farmers have developed strong relationships with their peers.  Approximately 68% receive some advice 
from other farmers in the last six months. 
In Colombia most of the land surrounding Bogota is privatized and farmers either own their own 
land, or they rent land, or they do some combination of both.  Approximately 36% of the farmers in the 
sample own the plots they farm, while 13% rent land from others and 45% own some of the land they 
farm and rent the rest from others.  The remaining 6% of the sample own their land in partnership 
(usually in the form of a cooperative).   The average household owns approximately 10.88 hectares of 
land.   This value is large and is likely slightly skewed by some of the very large farms in our sample.  
Indeed, the median household owns approximately 5 hectares of land.  Furthermore most households only 
cultivate the potato crop.  Approximately 62% of farmers only plant potatoes, while the remaining 38% 
cultivate a second or third type of crop.  However they rarely devote more than one or two hectares of 
land to the secondary crop, which is mainly harvested for the household’s private consumption.   The 
secondary crop is generally another tuber, onion, carrot or peas.  Finally, the majority of farmers also 
raise cattle and/or chickens on their land.  Approximately 81% own some form of livestock (primarily 
cows).   Many of the famers expressed a strong desire to move away from potato farming and invest more 
heavily in livestock.  This is attributable to the growing number of pests that plague the potato.  They also 
consider the livestock business to be a safer investment strategy. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Colombian Potato Farmers interviewed around Bogota, Colombia  
 
 
*The variables marked with a * are binary (0=No and 1=Yes) and hence do not have an interquartile range that 
can be interpreted.  We leave them blank. 
 
ii.  Experimental Game: Risk Preferences 
Reasons for Selecting This Game 
The survey is instrumental for collecting data on farmer characteristics such as wealth, farm size, 
and education, among others.   Nonetheless we also need to make use of an experimental game in order to 
estimate farmers’ risk preferences, which can also impact the decision to adopt.  
We use the experimental game designed by Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) because of its 
three major advantages.  Firstly it is structured based on prospect theory and reduces to EU under certain 
        
VARIABLES Mean 25% Median 75% 
      
Household Size  4.41 3 4 5 
      
Age  42.5 31.5 42 54 
      
Wealth (Proxy- Millions of Pesos)  9.23 0.8 3.25 16.55 
      
Education  8.63 7 7 12 
      
Total Farm size in hectares  10.88 3 5.85 10.41 
      
Livestock*   0.81 - - - 
      
Gender*  0.83 - - - 
      
Head of Household (Yes or No)*  0.69 - - - 
      
Own Land*  0.36 - - - 
      
Rent Land*  0.13 - - - 
      
Own and Rent Land*  0.45 - - - 
      
Own Land in Partnership*  0.06 - - - 
      
Member of FEDEPAPA*  0.75 - - - 
      
Advice FEDEPAPA*  0.83 - - - 
      
Advice from Other Farmers*  0.68 - - - 
      
55	  
conditions.  So while the game is designed to elicit three prospect theory parameters (risk aversion, loss 
aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting), it also supports EU if certain conditions hold.   The use of 
prospect theory is also better suited to answering our question of interest regarding technology adoption.  
Indeed farmers may choose not to adopt a new technology because they are extremely loss averse and 
they do not wish to take on any additional risks.  Their desire to maintain the status quo technology stems 
from this extreme aversion to loss.  This is also known as the status quo bias and can be readily addressed 
using Prospect theory (Kahneman et al. 1990).  
Secondly, this design was successfully implemented in Vietnam (Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen, 
2010) and China (Liu, 2012) where education levels are comparable to Colombia’s.  The game is fairly 
accessible to farmers with primary education, provided the researchers offer a comprehensive 
explanation.  Thirdly, the game uses real payouts with non-negligible sums.  The fact that subjects are 
playing for real, and potentially sizeable amounts, encourages them to take an interest in the game and 
answer truthfully.  Their responses to this experimental game can then be used to predict attitudes towards 
“real world” risks.   This idea that experimental games should involve real gambles for large stakes is 
well supported by the literature.  Indeed, several papers have compared the outcomes from using real 
versus hypothetical gambles.  The majority of these studies find that real payouts induce subjects to 
behave in a more risk averse fashion.24  Furthermore the literature argues in favor of high payouts.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) maintain that small stakes games restrict their generality because people 
tend to behave in a risk neutral manner.  Furthermore Holt and Laury (2000) provide conclusive evidence 
that high payouts with larger stakes are more effective than high payouts with lower stakes.  They 
demonstrate that subjects facing hypothetical choices have a hard time predicting how they would behave 
under high payoff conditions.  They find that subjects risk preferences change significantly in the face of 
real high payoffs but not hypothetical high payoffs.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Edwards, 1953;  Becker DeGroot and Marschak, 1963;  Camerer ,1985;  Camerer, 1995; Battalio, Kagen and Jirnayakul, 1990; Hogarth and 
Einhorn, 1990; Shoemaker, 1990; Slovic, 1969 
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We follow Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen (2010) and use a utility function given by cumulative 
prospect theory with a one-parameter form of Drazen Prelec (1998)’s axiomatically derived weighting 
function.  It can be written as follows:	  	  	  
For x>y>0 or x<y<0 (Gains OR Losses) 
U(x, p; y,q) = v(y)+π (p)(v(x)− v(y))  
For x<0<y  (Gains AND Losses) 
U(x, p; y,q) = π (p)v(x)+π (q)v(y) 	  
Where 
v(x) = x
σ
−λ(−xσ )
"
#
$
%$
π (p) = exp[−(− ln p)α ]
for x<0 only	  
	  
 
The utility function is constructed based on simple prospects of the form (x, p; y, q).  In such a 
formulation one receives x with probability p, y with probability q, and nothing with probability 1-p-q 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1974).  U (x, p; y, q) represents the expected prospect value.  The value of each 
prospect depends on two parameters: π and ν.  The first parameter π assigns a decision weight π(p) and 
q(p) to each probability (p) and (q).  This reflects the impact of each probability p and q on the overall 
value of the prospect.  The second parameter, ν, assigns a subjective value (a number) to each outcome.  
This value function depends on two parameters σ and λ.  More specifically, σ represents the concavity of 
the value function, which reflects a subject’s aversion or preference for risk.  Meanwhile, λ dictates the 
curvature of the utility function below zero relative to the curvature above zero and represents a subject’s 
degree of loss aversion (Liu 2012).  When  λ≠1, there is kink in the indifference curve around zero.  
Moreover a higher λ, indicates that the subject is more loss averse. 
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Finally, we follow Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen (2010) and use Prelec’s probability weighting 
function π(p), which depends on α.  If  α<1 then the function has an inverted S shape, which 
demonstrates that individuals overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities (as 
predicted by Khaneman and Tversky, 1979).  Conversely if α>1 then the weighting function has an S 
shape, which illustrates that individuals overweight small probabilities and underweight large 
probabilities.   
 
Procedure for Experimental Game 
Each participant is invited to play the risk game after completing the questionnaire.  Participants 
are generally assembled into groups of eight players with two enumerators leading the discussion and 
explaining the rules of the game.  Each subject is handed three sheets of paper corresponding to the three 
independent series of the game, which together comprise 35 pair wise lotteries.   Subjects are instructed to 
keep their answers to themselves and not to look at their neighbors’ sheet.  This specific instruction is 
repeated multiple times and on the rare occasion that the players still try to “cheat”, the enumerators will 
stand by that player and make sure the neighbors’ answers are shielded. 
The three series of pair-wise lotteries consist of 14, 14 and 7 rows respectively.  Each row 
contains two different lotteries: Cartagena or Bogota. In order to make the game more realistic and 
comprehensible to the players, the lotteries are assigned the names of two major cities in Colombia 
(Cartagena and Bogota).  Each enumerator then plays the role of a salesperson offering participants the 
chance to buy the lottery ticket from the city they represent.  Furthermore, to make the situation more 
tangible each new row is introduced as a new day of the week.  Please refer to Appendix 3 for an example 
of how these lotteries were displayed to farmers.   
The participants are asked to choose between the lottery from Bogota and the lottery from 
Cartagena for each row of the series.  As we will see below, the lottery from Bogota is inherently riskier.  
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Indeed, while there is a larger prize to be won from choosing Bogota, the chance of winning that prize is 
fairly small.   
The payoff matrix below corresponds to the first row of the first series.  It was also the row used 
to explain the concepts of the games to the players.     
 
 
Figure 4: Payoff Matrix for the First Row of Series 1 in the Experimental Risk Game 
 
The explanation of the previous matrix requires that a bingo cage with 10 balls be on display.  
Each ball within the cage has a number from 1 to 10 on it (which correspond to the 10 balls that are 
visible in the payoff matrix above).  The balls are passed around the group to prove to the subjects that 
each ball only appears once.  The enumerators explain that if ball 1 is drawn from the cage and the 
participant chooses the lottery from Bogota, they will win 15,600 pesos (roughly half a day’s wage).  
Conversely, if they select the lottery from Cartagena they will only win 9,176 (roughly a third of a day’s 
wage).    As a result Cartagena’s lottery provides a 30% chance of winning 9, 176 pesos and a 70% 
chance of winning 2,294 pesos.  On the other hand, Bogota’s lottery provides a 10% chance of winning 
15,600 pesos and a 90% chance of wining 1,147 pesos.  
Each subsequent row presents these two lottery choices with slightly different payoffs. More 
specifically, in Series 1 and 2, the lottery from Cartagena stays the same in expected value while the 
lottery from Bogota increases in expected value.  Initially, the expected value of the lottery from 
Cartagena exceeds the expected value associated with the lottery from Bogota.  Nevertheless, by row 
seven in Series 1, and row 1 in Series 2, the reverse is true, and the lottery from Bogota has the higher 
expected value.  An expected-value maximizer should switch from Cartagena to Bogota in the seventh 
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row of Series 1, and in the first row of Series 2.  The later a subject decides to switch over to Bogota, the 
more risk averse he or she is. 
In Series 3 we are dealing with gains and losses.  This time the payoffs associated with both 
lotteries change.  More specifically, the losses associated with Cartagena increase as we move down the 
rows and the losses associated with Bogota decrease.  The expected value of Bogota’s lottery exceeds that 
of Cartagena’s by the second row.  The later a subject decides to switch the more loss averse they are.  
The game officially begins once all the explanations are provided.  This generally takes 20 to 30 
minutes.  As a group we then proceed with each one of the three series of pairwise lotteries.  The farmers 
are asked to indicate which lottery ticket they prefer for each individual row of the series. Monotonic 
switching is enforced: subjects who switched over to the riskier lottery in Bogota are no longer allowed to 
select the lottery from Cartagena.   Nevertheless, each series is independent and, as a result, if players 
choose to switch to Bogota in Series 1, they can start over with Cartagena in Series 2.   Subjects can also 
choose to never switch, or to switch right away in row 1 of each series.    
Due to monetary constraints, not every row can be played for real money.  Subjects are warned at 
the beginning of the game that they will randomly select a day to be played for real money.  The 
enumerator will go around with a bag containing 35 balls, each one corresponding to a unique row of the 
game.  The farmers will then each select one ball that indicates which game they will play for real.   For 
example: suppose a subject chooses Bogota for the first row of Series 1 and the first row of Series one 
(Monday) is selected for actual payment.  Then if the number 1 ball is drawn from the bingo cage, the 
player will win 15,600 pesos.  However if balls 2-10 are drawn they will only win 1,147.    
The payoffs in Series 1 and 2 are strictly positive while the payoffs in Series 3 are made to be 
both positive and negative.  As a result, it is theoretically possible to lose money in the game.  
Nevertheless it would have been unethical to take money away from our subjects.  Therefore, at the 
beginning of each game, we announce that we will be compensating farmers for their participation in the 
study.  Any losses they might incur in the game will simply be deducted from this fixed amount.  In the 
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end the average payoff was approximately 10,000 pesos or, equivalently, one third of a day’s wage.   This 
highest possible payoff was 390,000 Colombian pesos, or $215.  
 
Estimation of Parameters 
Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen (2010) construct their game so that “any combination of choices in 
the three series determines a particular interval of prospect theory parameter values” (Tanaka, Camerer 
and Nguyen, 2010). In particular, the switching points in Series 1 and Series 2 are used to find the 
curvature of the utility function, σ, and the nonlinear probability weighting parameter α.  The estimate of 
σ is then used along with the switching point in Series 3 to determine the loss aversion parameter λ.   The 
following Table 3, borrowed from Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen (2010), clearly demonstrates that each 
combination of switching points from the three series produces a unique set of values for σ, α and λ. 
 
Series One Questions                                                   Series Two Questions                                      
 
σ \α  0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
0.2 9 10 11 12 13 14 Never 
0.3 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
0.4 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
0.5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
0.6 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0.7 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0.8 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0.9 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 	  
Series 3 Questions 
 σ=0.2 σ=0.4 σ=0.6 σ=0.8 
1 λ>0.14 λ>0.17 λ>0.20 λ>0.25 
2 0.14<λ<1.26 0.17<λ<1.32 0.20<λ<1.38 0.25<λ<1.45 
3 1.26<λ<1.88 1.32<λ<1.77 1.38<λ<1.71 1.45<λ<1.69 
4 1.88<λ<2.31 1.77<λ<2.25 1.71<λ<2.25 1.69<λ<2.30 
5 2.31<λ<4.32 2.25<λ<3.95 2.25<λ<3.73 2.30<λ<3.63 
6 4.32<λ<5.43 3.95<λ<5.03 3.73<λ<4.82 3.63<λ<4.76 
7 5.43<λ<9.78 5.03<λ<9.29 4.82<λ<9.14 4.76<λ<9.27 
Table 3:  Switching Points and Approximations for σ, α and λ: Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) 
 
σ \α  0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
0.2 Never 14 13 12 11 10 9 
0.3 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 
0.4 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 
0.5 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 
0.6 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 
0.7 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 
0.8 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 
0.9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
1.0 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
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The values in this table are derived using different sets of inequalities, which are constructed from 
the switching points in each one of the three series.  The following paragraph explains how these 
inequalities are created.  To begin, if a farmer switches at question N, we assume they preferred lottery 
Cartagena to lottery Bogota in the N-1th row, and Bogota to Cartagena in the Nth row.  We can then infer 
that they derive a higher expected utility from Cartagena (UC) in the N-1th row, and from Bogota (UB) in 
the Nth row.  A concrete example provides further insight. If a subject chooses to switch at the 7th row in 
Series 1 and 2, the following inequalities should hold: 
 
Series 1: UC6(x, p; y, q)> UB6(x, p; y, q) (1) 
Series 1: UC7(x, p; y, q)< UB7(x, p; y, q)             (2) 
Series 2: UC6(x, p; y, q)> UB6(x, p; y, q)             (3) 
Series 2: UC7(x, p; y, q)< UB7(x, p; y, q)             (4) 
 
We substitute in the utility function, U=v(y)+ π(p)(v(x)-v(y)),  given by cumulative prospect 
theory (with a one-parameter form of Prelec’s weighting function), where v(x)= (xσ) and π(p)= exp[-(-
log(p)) α].  We also plug in the numerical values of the gambles.  We obtain the following: 
 
(2294σ)+exp(-(-log(0.3))α)*((9176σ)-(2294α) > (1147^σ)+exp(-(-log(0.1))α)*((28676σ)-(1147α))      (5) 
(2294σ)+exp(-(-log(0.3))α)*((9176σ)-(2294α)) < (1147σ)+exp(-(-log(0.1))α)*((34411σ)-(1147α))      (6) 
(6882σ)+exp(-(-log(0.9))α)*((9176σ)-(6882α)) > (1147σ)+exp(-(-log(0.7))α)*((14911σ)-(1147α))      (7) 
(6882σ)+exp(-(-log(0.9))α)*((9176σ)-(6882α)) < (1147σ)+exp(-(-log(0.7))α)*((15600σ)-(1147α))      (8) 
 
We can find ranges for σ and α that satisfy the above inequalities.  In this case they are 
0.65<σ<0.74 and 0.66<α<0.74.  As in Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen (2010) and Liu (2012), we 
approximate the values of (σ, α) by selecting the midpoint of each interval.  Therefore in this example (σ, 
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α) are estimated to be (0.7,0.7).    Some subjects decide not to switch at any point in the series.  In this 
case the values at the boundary are used (Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen, 2010).  
We use a similar set of inequalities to derive our estimates for our parameter for loss aversion (λ).  
In this case inference depends on two critical pieces of information:  the estimate for σ, and the switching 
point in Series 3.  According to Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen (2009) “the probability sensitivity 
parameter, α, plays no role in Series 3 since all prospects involve equal (50%) chances of gain and loss, 
so the probability weighting terms drop out in calculating prospect values”.   Yet again we construct the 
inequalities based on the assumption that if a subject switches at the Nth row, they prefer Cartagena in the 
N-1th row, and Bogota in the Nth row.  Therefore if a subject chooses to switch at the 3rd row in Series 1 
and 2, the following inequalities should hold: 
 
Series 3: UC2(x, p; y, q)> UB2(x, p; y, q)                                        (1) 
Series 3: UC3(x, p; y, q)< UB3(x, p; y, q)                                        (2) 
 
We substitute in the utility function.  Because we are dealing with gains and losses, U= 
π(p)(v(x))+ π(q)(v(y)) and the value function takes on the two forms: v(x)= -λ(-xσ) for losses and (xσ) for 
gains.   We also choose a value for σ.   Here we select σ=0.2. 
 
(-λ*((exp[-(-ln0.5)])(-9170.2))+ (exp[-(-ln0.5)])(9170.2) > -λ*((exp[-(-ln0.5)])(-48170.2))+ (exp[-(-ln0.5)])(68820.2)  (3) 
(-λ*((exp[-(-ln0.5)])(-9170.2))+ (exp[-(-ln0.5)])(2290.2) < -λ*((exp[-(-ln0.5)])(-48170.2))+ (exp[-(-ln0.5)])(68820.2)  (4) 
 
We can find the range for λ that satisfy the above inequalities, conditional on a value of σ.   Here 
it is 1.28<λ<1.85.  Yet again some subjects decide not to switch at any point in the series.  In this case we 
use the values at the boundary.  
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The mean values of σ and α are therefore 0.57 and 0.83 respectively.  The fact that α<1 
demonstrates that individuals tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities. 
Furthermore, these values for σ and α are very similar to the estimates from other experiments that use 
the same design.  Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen (2010) estimate average values of (0.59, 0.74) and (0.63, 
0.74) in the south and north of Vietnam, respectively.  Liu (2012) finds average values of (0.48, 0.69) in 
China.  We also estimate the average value of λ, which is 3.12.  This is very similar to Liu’s (2012) 
estimate of 3.47, and slightly higher than the average value calculated by Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen 
(2010) of 2.63. Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen’s (2010) estimate is closer to the value of 2.25 estimated by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992). 
We use a T-test to reject the null hypothesis that α=1 and λ=1 at the 1% significance level.   This 
means that we can reject EU theory in favor of PT.  This validates the use of Tanaka Camerer and 
Nguyen’s (2010) framework to tease out farmers’ risk preferences.  
 
Determinants of Preference Parameters 
We regress each prospect theory parameter, σ, α, and λ on a series of explanatory variables.  We 
use OLS regressions for σ, α and interval regressions using maximum likelihood techniques for λ.  Every 
regression uses robust standard errors to account for possible heteroskedasticity.  Furthermore, we rely on 
the literature to guide us in our selection of the dependent variables.  We choose to include age, household 
status, gender, education and our proxy for wealth (total value of assets).  This is consistent with Tanaka 
Camerer and Nguyen (2010) and Liu’s (2012) papers.  
When running the regressions for σ and α we also drop any observations that fail to switch in 
Series 1 and Series 2 because we are unable to calculate precise estimates for their σ and α.  Indeed, when 
subjects do not switch from lottery Cartagena to Bogota the approximate values at the boundary have to 
be used.  Liu (2012) mentions that for those who do not switch she “arbitrarily” determines the 
lower/upper bound.  Tanaka Camerer and Nguyen (2010) use the same approach.  Both sets of authors 
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admit that this could introduce additional noise.   We want to avoid introducing random noise, and 
therefore we choose to drop the observations that cannot be precisely estimated.  Similarly in our 
regression for λ we also dropped observations that did not switch in Series 3.  
The regression can be expressed as follows:  
σ=β0+ β1(HH)+β2(AGE)+β3(GENDER)+β4(HSCHOOL)+β5(GRAD)+β6(WEALTH)+ ε         (1) 
α =β0+ β1(HH)+β2(AGE)+β3(GENDER)+β4(HSCHOOL)+β5(GRAD)+β6(WEALTH)+ ε       (2) 
λ =β0+ β1(HH)+β2(AGE)+β3(GENDER)+β4(HSCHOOL)+β5(GRAD)+β6(WEALTH)+ ε        (3) 
 
The results are detailed in the following Table 4.  These results are robust to various different 
specifications and a range of proxies for wealth.   Furthermore these results are robust to dropping the 
observations with extremely large levels of wealth.   
Table 4: Regression Results of Prospect Theory Parameters  
 
     σ          λ  α 
VARIABLES 
 
 Curvature  Loss Aversion  Probability Weight 
Head of Household  0.023  -1.318*  0.119* 
  (0.0769)  (0.7485)  (0.0687) 
Age  0.006***  0.030  -0.003 
  (0.0024)  (0.0237)  (0.0021) 
Gender  0.122  0.124  -0.027 
  (0.0810)  (0.7403)  (0.0717) 
High School  0.177***  -0.650  -0.006 
  (0.0631)  (0.4976)  (0.0629) 
Graduate School  0.323***  -1.789**  -0.163** 
  (0.0822)  (0.752)  (0.0749) 
Wealth (Proxy)  0.004**  -0.011  0.001 
  (0.0016)  (0.0159)  (0.0020) 
Constant  0.076  2.967***  0.892*** 
  (0.114)  (0.9752)  (0.1010) 
Observations  140  140  140 
R squared  0.194    0.0484 
Prob > F  0.0000    0.2286 
Wald chi2 (6)    8.97   
Prob > chi2    0.1751   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The first column presents the results we obtain from regressing σ (the curvature of the utility 
function) on the defined set of explanatory variables.  We find that older farmers with higher levels of 
education are more risk loving.   Similarly, wealthier farmers also have a higher tolerance for risk.  This 
result is consistent with Liu’s (2012) findings from China.  More generally, the literature on whether 
wealth significantly impacts risk preferences remains inconclusive. Cardenas and Carpenter provide a 
detailed review of these studies.  
We then investigate the factors that influence the loss aversion parameter λ in Table 3.  We find 
that farmers who act as heads of households, and farmers with graduate degrees, are generally less loss 
averse.  Finally we regress the nonlinear probability weighting parameter α on the independent variables.  
The only determinants to affect this weighting parameter are education and having the status of head of 
household.   
The results from Table 3 identify the primary factors that contribute to risk aversion and loss 
aversion among Colombian farmers.  In the following section we investigate specifically whether risk 
preferences influence the decision to adopt a new technology and the extent to which farmers adopt.  If 
we find that risk is a significant barrier to adoption, we can then use the results from Table 3 to identify 
the specific attributes that cause farmers to be risk averse, and hence to refuse the new technology.  
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Section V: Model and Econometric Framework 
The preceding section went through a detailed description of the data collection process.  We 
were successfully able to collect information on our two dependent variables of interest: willingness to 
adopt and extent of adoption.  Furthermore we gathered detailed data on the two potential barriers of 
adoption: features of the new technology and characteristics of the farmer.   Some variables were harder 
to measure than others.   In particular we needed to implement an experimental game in order to assess 
farmers’ individual risk preferences.  
The following section details the econometric model we used to answer our two primary 
questions of interest.  Firstly, what factors influence the decision to adopt a new technology?  Secondly, 
what are the main barriers affecting the extent to which a farmer adopts?  More precisely we want to 
determine whether a farmer’s risk preferences affects the decision to adopt, and the extent of adoption.   
I.  Model: Do risk preferences affect willingness to adopt? 
A farmer’s decision to adopt can be modeled using a random utility framework.  The following 
section provides a detailed overview of the model.   A farmer ‘n’ faces a choice between two alternatives i 
(i=1,2).  In this case the alternatives refer to two technologies labeled A and B.   Technology A represents 
the status quo technology currently being used by farmers and technology B represents the new 
alternative. The farmer obtains a certain level of utility from each technology and will chose technology 
A if it provides a greater level of utility than technology B.   The behavioral model can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
Choose alternative A if and only if  
 
UnA (YA, CA, EA, LA, RδA, Xn)> UnB (YB, CB, EB, LB, RδB, Xn)                                                      (1) 
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Where Y is the yield of the technology, C is the cost, E is the environmental/health impact, L is 
the labor requirements, and R is the farmer’s individual risk preference (calculated as σ in the 
experimental game).  The parameter δ represents farmers’ perception of the technology’s risk.  We 
assume that δB >δA , because a new technology will always be perceived to involve more risk than 
maintaining the status quo.  We hereby refer to Rδ as the farmer’s overall risk parameter. The variable 
‘Xn’ is a vector of farm and farmer characteristics such as age, education, wealth, gender, and land 
holdings. 
Researchers cannot fully observe a subject’s utility, and therefore the inequality must be rewritten as 
follows: 
 
VnA (YA, CA, EA, LA,RδA, x)+ εNA > VnB (YB, CB, EB, LB, RδB, x) + εNB                                                        (2) 
 
Where V is the deterministic part of the utility function and εNA and εNB are i.i.d random variables 
with zero means. V is observable because it depends on the features of the technology, as well as the 
characteristics of the farmer.  The random variable εN contains all the factors affecting utility that 
researchers cannot observe.   The vector εN = (εNA,εNB) has a joint density function ƒ(εN).  Moreover, as is 
typical in the literature, we assume that V is linear: 
 
Vni= β0+β1 x+β 2Yi+β3Ci+β4 Ei+β5 Li+β6 Rδi +εi                                                                               (3) 
 
The decision to adopt a new technology can then be expressed in a probability framework as 
follows:  
 
PnB = Prob (UNB > UNA)                                                                                                                       (4) 
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PnB = Prob (εNA - εNB  < VNB - VNA)                                                                                                       (5) 
PnB = Prob (εNA - εNB  < β2 (YB – YA)+ β3 (CB-CA)+ β4 (LB – LA) + β5 (EB –EA)+ β6 R (δB -δA))             (6) 
 
This probability is a cumulative distribution.   It is the probability that each random term (εNB - 
εNA) is below a fixed amount (VNA - VNB).   In other words the probability that a farmer chooses technology 
A over B is equal to the probability that the unobserved portion of utility for technology B does not 
exceed the unobserved portion of utility for A, by an amount greater than (VNA - VNB).  We can rewrite the 
probability statement by using the density function: 
 
PnA =∫ I (εNB - εNA < VNA - VNB ) ƒ(εN) d (εN)                                              (7) 
 
Where I is an indicator function if (εNB - εNA < VNA - VNB) is true and 0 otherwise.   Different 
discrete choice models are obtained from different assumptions about the distribution of εN, the 
unobserved part of the farmer’s utility.   In this study we assume the errors are i.i.d extreme value.  
Therefore  (εNB - εNA) follows a logistic distribution.  We can rewrite the probability statement as: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (8)	  
                                                                                    (9) 
 
We estimate this model using maximum likelihood estimation techniques.  More specifically we 
run a logit model, which allows us to identify the parameters that are most likely to influence the 
PnA =
eVnA
∑
i
eVni =
eβo+β1x+β2YA+β3CA+β4EA+β5LA+β6RδA
eβo+β1x+β2YA+β3CA+β4EA+β5LA+β6RδA + eβo+β1x+β2YB+β3CB+β4EB+β5LB+β6RδB
PnA =
eβ2ΔY+β3ΔC+β4ΔE+β5ΔL+β6RΔδ
1+ eβ2ΔY+β3ΔC+β4ΔE+β5ΔL+β6RΔδ
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probability of switching over to a new technology.   This requires finding the value of β that maximizes 
the log likelihood function: 
 
                                                  (10)	  
II. Econometric Framework: Do risk preferences affect extent of adoption? 
When farmers are confronted with a new technology they must first decide whether or not to 
adopt it.  If they choose to do so, farmers must then select how many acres they will devote to the new 
technology.   The previous section went through a detailed explanation of the random utility model we 
selected to identify the factors that influence the decision to adopt.   The model is based on the data we 
collected from our CE, in which farmers had to choose between two competing technologies.   
Next we focus on the second decision facing farmers, regarding the extent of adoption.  We 
follow Cooper’s (1996, 1997) econometric approach and model the amount of land farmers intend to 
devote to the new technology as a function of various explanatory variables.  Ideally the dependent 
variable would be the number of acres that farmers intend to assign to the new technology.   Nevertheless, 
we are not working with a specific technology in this study, and we do not think that it would have been 
useful to present farmers with a fictitious technology in order to assess the number of acres they would 
allocate to it.  This would have prompted random and uninformed answers.  Moreover local agronomists 
had indicated to us that farmers would only try a new technology if they were given some financial 
incentive to do so.   Therefore it would not be realistic to ask farmers about how much land they would 
devote to a new technology, since they probably would not do so without some form of monetary 
compensation.  
As a result we ask farmers how much land they are willing to rent out to Cornell University.  We 
explain to the farmers that a team of scientists from Cornell needs the land to test the efficiency of a new, 
pesticide free, technology suitable for dealing with the potato moth.  We determine that this was a good 
LL(β ) = ∑
n=1
N
∑
i
yni ln(Pni ) =∑
i=1
2
yni ln(Pni ){ + (1− yni )(1− ln(Pni ))}
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proxy for the amount of land they might to devote to a new technology, should it be offered in the future.  
This question is asked as a follow up question to the CV question “are you willing to rent land".   This 
becomes our dependent variable of interest.   
Contrary to most papers in this field, we opt to use the amount of land farmers say they will rent 
rather than the proportion of land, for a number of reasons.  Firstly Colombian farmers do not tend to 
think in percentage terms (as demonstrated by the risk game).  Secondly, the question is not designed to 
elicit responses in percentage terms.  Indeed when farmers think about the amount of land they will rent, 
they rarely exceed 10% of their overall land holdings.  Therefore to avoid dealing with miniscule 
percentages we keep our dependent variable in hectares.  Finally we decide to follow Cooper (1996,1997) 
who publish two significant papers on the use of WTA CVs in order to understand technology adoption.  
He consistently uses to amount of land, rather than proportion of land, as the dependent variable of 
interest.   
We selected our independent variables among the pool of factors that can potentially impact 
adoption decisions.  A detailed overview of such variables was presented in the literature review.   Indeed, 
there is no reason to believe that the variables affecting adoption should be any different from those 
affecting the extent to which the farmer will adopt.  As a result we include age, gender, education, wealth 
(proxy by durable goods), individual risk preference (σ), a private and public source of information, total 
farm size, and the predicted price at which the farmers agreed to rent their land.  The majority of these 
explanatory variables appear in similar studies that use CVs to understand technology adoption (Qaim 
and de Janvry (2003), Hubbell and Mara, 2000).  The variables for private and public information 
represent our contemporaneous measures of farmers’ social networks.  This will illustrate whether a 
farmer’s access to social networks has any impact on their decision to adopt.   
Furthermore we do not include credit constraints here because, as mentioned previously, we had 
no prior reason to believe that they would be binding.  Firstly, there is widespread access to credit in these 
areas of Colombia. Approximately 85% of the sample was able to take out loans in the last five years.   
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Moreover, 80% of participating farmers accessed this credit through some form of financial institution.  
Secondly, among those households who took out loans, the majority (60%) deemed that the interest rates 
they were charged were fair.   Thirdly, credit constraints are less likely to bind because the new 
hypothetical technologies we offered to farmers did not require large investments relative to Colombian 
farmers’ income.  	  
Moreover we are the first paper to include a measure of risk preferences in such a model.  This 
variable enables us to determine whether or not a farmer’s degree of risk aversion influences the extent to 
which they adopt.   Therefore we have the following reduced form equation: 
 
HECTARES= β 0+β  1 (Age)+β 2 (Gender)+β 3 (Educ) + β 4  (Risk)+ β 5 (Private Info) + β 6 (Private Info) + β 7 
(Total Farm Size)  + β 8 (Price) + β 8 (Wealth) + ε i 
 
Where the dependent variable “hectares” is the amount of land farmers are willing to rent to 
Cornell University.  This is a continuous variable, which is recorded for all farmers who answer, “yes” to 
the hypothetical CV question “are you willing to rent out land”.  We attribute a value of zero to those 
farmers who answer 'no' to the CV question, thereby disclosing that they do not want to rent their land at 
either of the price points offered (400,000 or 600,000 pesos). 
This model could have been estimated using OLS, but the results would have been biased because 
our data is censored. More specifically, OLS estimation using censored data “will lead to inconsistent 
estimation of the slope parameter since a linear approximation to the censored means will have a flatter 
slope than that for the original uncensored mean” (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). To correct for this we use 
a Tobit model.  The Tobit model assumes that the errors are normally distributed and homoscedastic.    
Most of the papers that explore technology adoption using CVs employ the Heckman selection 
model rather than the Tobit, in order to deal with the censored dependent variable.  The Heckman model 
is appropriate when the dependent variable of interest is only observed for a selected sample that is not 
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representative of the population being considered.  In other words the Heckman should be used when the 
researcher suspects that there is sample selection bias.  Hubbell and Mara (2000), De Janvry and Quaim 
(2003), and Cooper (1996) all argue in their respective papers that the sample of farmers who answer 
“yes” to the WTA/WTP question regarding adoption is not randomly drawn from the entire population of 
respondents.  Therefore they proceed with the Heckman model.  
The Heckman selection model needs to satisfy certain conditions before it can be used for 
estimation purposes.  The Heckman model consists of a selection equation and an outcome equation.  The 
selection equation is used to estimate the probability of being observed, which in this case would be the 
probability of renting land to Cornell.  The outcome equation is then used to explain the outcome variable 
of interest, which in this case would be the amount of land rented in hectares.  For the Heckman model to 
produce consistent estimates, there needs to be some variables Z that affect the probability of observing 
the dependent variable of interest Y, without affecting Y directly.  In other words there needs to be some 
variables that affect the “selection” equation but not the “outcome” equation.   If this is not the case, then 
most researchers argue that the Heckman model should not be applied.  According to Kennedy, 
simulations have demonstrated that the Heckman procedure fails to produce consistent estimates when the 
variables in the selection and outcome equations are highly collinear, (Kennedy 1998). 
We decide against the Heckman model because we do not have any obvious exclusion restriction 
(variables affecting the first stage residual but not directly appearing in the second stage regression).  
Therefore our outcome and selection equations are the same, which implies that the identification will 
depend entirely on the non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio. It then becomes necessary to have enough 
explanatory variables to allow this non-linearity to impact the outcome.   This is very difficult to achieve, 
and therefore we opted for the Tobit model.  
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Section VI: Results 
We have reviewed the theoretical model and econometric framework for answering the two 
primary questions of interest.  We proceed with our final section, which details our results.  
I.  Results First Main Outcome: Do risk preferences affect willingness to adopt? 
The first set of results identifies the factors that influence farmers’ willingness to adopt a new 
technology.  The choice experiment was used to determine whether or not people would switch to a new 
technology.  This represents our measure for their willingness to adopt.  The explanatory variables were 
selected based on the two potential barriers to adoption: the features of the new technology and the 
personal attributes of the farmers, including risk preferences.  These variables were collected from the 
choice experiment, the questionnaire and the risk game.  The regression results from the logit model are 
presented in the following Table 5.   We report the marginal effects. We also use cluster robust standard 
errors because we have nine observations for each individual.  Each observation corresponds to a different 
decision the farmer made during the choice experiment, which consisted of nine choice sets.  
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Table 5:  Regression Results - Determinants of Willingness to Adopt 
 
VARIABLES  Adopt New 
Technology 
Yield  0.013*** 
  (0.00169) 
Cost  -0.004*** 
  (0.00085) 
More Labor  -0.205*** 
  (.0388629) 
Less Labor   0.162*** 
  (0.05095) 
Healthier  0.394*** 
  (0.04049) 
Cost*Healthier  0.002 ** 
  (0.00113) 
Yield*Healthier  -0.008*** 
  (0.00243) 
More Labor*Healthier  0.117** 
 
Less Labor*Healthier 
 
 
(0.05088) 
-0.105  
(0.09512) 
Risk Parameter (R (δB -δA))  0.055 
  (0.05764) 
Constant  0.0647 
  (0.219) 
N  1260 
Wald chi2 (10)  182.39 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Our main finding is that only one of the two potential barriers to adoption actually impacts the 
probability of adopting.  Indeed, the decision seems to rest solely on the features of the technologies 
themselves: namely, whether they provide more yield, require less labor and fewer costs, and whether 
they protect the environment.  Conversely, farmers’ levels of education, age, gender and other social 
factors do not seem to impact the decision to adopt.  Most importantly farmers’ risk parameter is not 
significant.   The Wald test suggests that this model is a good fit for the data.  Moreover the model is 
robust to different specifications.  We tried interacting the risk parameter with different features of the 
new technology but this did not change the results.   
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A more detailed analysis of the results reveals which attributes of the technologies farmers’ value 
most.   We first analyze the main effects of each attribute from their respective coefficient estimates. 
Firstly, their decision to adopt relies heavily on the technology’s environmental and health impact.  
Indeed if a technology is healthier the farmer is at least 39% more likely to adopt it.  This assumes that all 
the other features of the new technology are the same as the status quo. During the survey process farmers 
repeatedly expressed their concerns over the heavy use of pesticides in the region.  They understood the 
consequences of over-exposure and were interested in learning about new ways to reduce the use of toxic 
chemicals.    
Secondly, farmers tend to focus on the labor requirements of the technology.  A farmer is 20% 
less likely to adopt the new technology if it requires more labor, all else equal. Conversely they are 16% 
more likely to adopt if the technology has fewer labor demands.  Potato cultivation is particularly labor 
intensive, and the majority of farmers in the sample were already working full time on their own land.  
They also had to hire external labor during peak seasons (planting and harvesting).  As a result it was hard 
for them to conceive of providing more labor, whereas they welcomed the opportunity to supply less.  
Finally Table 5 demonstrates that a technology’s estimated yield and cost levels influences 
farmers’ decision to adopt.  These variables are measured continuously and therefore a 1-unit increase in 
yield leads to a 1.2% increase in the probability of adopting all else equal.  Conversely a 1-unit increase 
in cost decreases the probability of adoption by 0.4%.  Yields are measured in “cargas”, where one 
“carga” is 100 kilograms, and costs are measured in pesos.  At first glance, the impact of yield and cost 
seem rather low.  Nevertheless the alternative technologies we present to farmers produced up to 30 more 
cargas (3000 kilos) and could increase in cost by 75,000 pesos (40 US dollars).  Based on the previous 
results, a farmer would be 36% more likely to adopt a technology that produced 30 more cargas (3000 
kilos).  Similarly a farmer would be 29% less likely to adopt a new technology that demanded 75,000 
more pesos (40 US dollars).   
We also include three interaction terms in the reduced form equation.  The interaction terms 
reveal the importance that farmers place on health.  More specifically, these variables reveal the extent to 
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which farmers are willing to make compromises with regard to the three other attributes of the technology 
(lower yield, higher cost, more labor), in exchange for a healthier technology.  Firstly, as we have seen, 
the coefficient on cost is negative, suggesting that farmers are less likely to adopt if the technology is 
more expensive.  Moreover, the coefficient on the term “cost*health” is positive.  This indicates that 
farmers are “less unwilling” to switch to a new technology that is more expensive, if they know it to be 
healthier.  Accordingly, while a 1-unit increase in cost decreases the probability of adoption by 0.4%, the 
probability only decreases by 0.2% if the technology is also healthy/environmentally friendly. 
Secondly we have established that the coefficient on yield is positive, which indicates that 
farmers are more likely to adopt a new technology if it provides a higher yield.  Moreover the coefficient 
on the interaction term “yield*health” is negative.  This indicates that farmers do not place as much 
emphasis on a yield increase if the technology already boasts a lower environmental impact.   More 
specifically the probability of adoption falls from 1.2% to 0.46%.   
Finally, we have determined that the probability of adoption is inversely correlated with the 
amount of labor the technology requires.  Moreover the coefficients on the interaction terms “more labor* 
healthier” and “less labor* healthier” are positive and negative respectively.   So while an increase in 
labor leads to a decrease in the probability of adoption by 20%, this percentage is reduced to 9% if the 
technology has a lower environmental/health impact.  Yet again this indicates that farmers become “less 
unwilling” to adopt a technology that requires more labor, if they know it to be healthier.   Furthermore, 
while a decrease in labor generates a 16% increase in the probability of adopting, this percentage falls to 
6% when the technology is more environmentally friendly.  This illustrates that the farmer considers the 
technology's labor requirements to be less important if he/she already knows it to be healthier.  
These results indicate that the decision to adopt a new technology is heavily based on the 
attributes of the technologies themselves.  Moreover the decision does not seem to depend on a farmer’s 
personal characteristics.  Indeed the coefficient on the risk parameter is positive but not statistically 
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insignificant.25  Furthermore, we investigate the impact of several additional characteristics such as age 
and gender on the decision to adopt, by including various interaction terms in the regression. We test 
several different models with a wide range of interactions terms, but they all proved to be insignificant.   
As a result, we conclude that the decision to adopt a new technology is primarily determined by the 
attributes of the technologies themselves rather than a farmer’s personal characteristics.  
These results are better understood in the context of the study’s specific sample of farmers.  
Indeed the majority of farmers are connected with the local potato association (FEDEPAPA).  They often 
interact with the institution’s agronomists, who travel regularly to the village, or to the farmers’ homes, to 
recommend new farming strategies.  Therefore, our sample of farmers is familiar with the process of 
adopting new technologies.  We might expect that they would weight the characteristics of the new 
technologies we are currently offering more heavily than anything else.  Furthermore our sample of 
farmers has self-selected into this association which means they already place value on being part of a 
group that promotes best practices in potato farming.    
 
II. Results Second Main Outcome: Do risk preferences affect extent of adoption? 
We began by identifying two potential barriers to adoption: features of the new technology and 
personal characteristics of the farmer.  Our analysis reveals that a farmer’s decision to adopt depends on 
the former but not the latter.   Indeed we successfully established that farmers are much more likely to 
adopt a new farming technique if they value the features it possesses.  We also find that farmers’ personal 
characteristics such as age, gender, and education do not significantly influence the decision.  Of 
particular interest is the fact that a farmer’s preference for risk does not seem to have any impact on the 
decision to adopt a new technology.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This indicates that as farmers risk parameter increases, the probability of adopting goes up.  Recall that the risk parameter is comprised of two 
elements: the farmer’s individual risk preferences and their perception of the technology’s risk.  As it stands we are unable to separate the effect 
of these two variables.  Indeed we do not know whether the coefficient we are finding on this risk parameter term is driven primarily by the 
farmer’s personal risk preferences or their risk perception.  The reason this is so difficult to interpret is because farmers’ risk perception is almost 
certainly some function of their risk preference.   We leave this for future research, as it is not relevant to the current study since this risk 
parameter is insignificant to begin with.   
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While personal characteristics such as risk preferences may not affect the probability of adoption, 
they still have the potential to determine the extent to which farmers adopt.  More specifically, we 
hypothesize that farmers who are more risk loving will devote a greater percentage of their land to the 
new technology.   In order to test this hypothesis we made use of a CV question as detailed in the 
previous section.  Our dependent variable of interest is the amount of land farmers are willing to rent to 
Cornell University in order for their scientists to test the efficiency of a new technology on the potato 
crop.  This serves as a proxy for the amount of land they would devote to a new technology should it 
become available.  It is also our measure for extent of adoption. The results are provided in Table 6.  
We report three different marginal effects.  There is some debate as to which of these effects 
should be reported in a Tobit model.  We decided to provide all three for completeness.  First we state the 
marginal effects on the expected value of the latent dependent variable y*.  Second we display the 
marginal effects on the expected value of the dependent variable y, for all observations. Finally we report 
the marginal effects on the expected value for y given y>0 (for censored observations only).  
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Table 6: Regression Results – Determinants of Extent of Adoption (Marginal Effects) 
 
 Latent y 
 
Observable y 
 
Censored y 
 
Risk (σ) 0.517* 0.397* 0.285* 
 (0.2842) (0.2185) (0.1574) 
Head of Household -0.041 -0.031 -0.022 
 (0.	  2482) (0.1917) (0.1378) 
Age -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.0089) (0.0068) (0.0049) 
Gender 0.184 0.141 0.101 
 (0.2687) (0.2064) (0.1485) 
High School 0.008 0.006 0.004 
 (0.2483) (0.1906) (0.1370) 
Graduate School -0.191 -0.146 -0.105 
 (0.3252) (0.2493) (0.1792) 
Advice Farmers 0.325* 0.249* 0.179* 
 (0.1902) (0.1462) (0.1051) 
Advice FedePapa -0.067 -0.051 -0.037 
 (0.2914) (0.2236) (0.1608) 
Wealth (Proxy) 0.005 0.004 0.003 
 (0.0065) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
Total Farm Size -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.0049) (0.0037) (0.0027) 
Price -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.0056) (0.0044) (0.0031) 
Constant 3.654 3.654 3.654 
 (2.917) (2.917) (2.917) 
N 136 136 136 
LR chi2 (10) 11.96 11.96 11.96 
Prob > chi2 0.3252 0.3252 0.3252 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Our main finding is that farmers’ risk preferences significantly impact the extent to which they 
adopt a new technology.  More specifically, we find that as farmers become more risk loving, they are 
willing to rent out more land.   Accordingly, a one-unit increase in farmer’s risk preferences causes them 
to rent out an additional 0.5 hectares of land (or by 0.4 hectares if we are looking at the dependent 
variable y in Column 2; and by 0.29 if we are looking at the censored observations only in Column 3). 
Additionally, we find that farmers' interaction with their social network also influences the 
amount of capital they are willing to invest in a new technique.  Indeed, farmers seeking regular advice 
from others are willing to rent out an additional 0.3 hectares of land (or by 0.25 hectares if we are looking 
∂E[y* | x]
∂x
∂E[y | x]
∂x
∂E[y | x, y > 0]
∂x
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at the dependent variable y in Column 2; and by 0.18 if we are looking at the censored observations only 
in Column 3).  The remaining personal characteristics such as age, gender, and education do not 
significantly impact the extent to which farmers adopt a new technology.   Nevertheless the signs on the 
coefficients are exactly what we would expect (more educated, younger males will rent out the most 
land). 
We also conducted a number of robustness checks by formulating alternative specifications for 
the reduced form equation.  The results are presented in the following Table 7.   For these alternative 
models we only report the marginal effects on the expected value of the dependent variable y, for all 
observations.   The impact of risk and social networks remains almost exactly the same across each 
model: 
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Table 7: Regression Results – Determinants of Extent of Adoption (Robustness Checks) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Risk (σ)  0.397*  0.378*  0.367* 
  (0.2185)  (0.2161)  (0.2058) 
Head of Household  -0.031  -0.039   
  (0.1917)  (0.1907)   
Age  -0.005  -0.004   
  (0.0068)  (0.0064)   
Gender  0.141  0.124   
  (0.2064)  (0.2043)   
High School  0.006  0.025  0.105 
  (0.1906)  (0.1818)  (0.1606) 
Graduate School  -0.146  -0.188  -0.237 
  (0.2493)  (0.2368)  (0.2275) 
Advice Farmers  0.249*  0.252*  0.230** 
  (0.1462)  (0.1458)  (0.1429) 
Advice FedePapa  -0.051     
  (0.2236)     
Wealth (Proxy)  0.004  0.003  0.003 
  (0.0037)  (0.0047)  (0.0047) 
Price  -0.002  -0.004   
  (0.0037)  (0.0031)   
Total Farm Size  -0.006     
  (0.0044)     
Constant  3.654  2.833  0.106 
  (2.917)  (2.005)  (0.2173) 
N  136  136  136 
LR chi2 (10)  11.96  11.84  10.05 
Prob > chi2  0.3252  0.2007  0.0737 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These results highlight the importance of understanding farmers’ risk preferences, as well as their 
access to social networks.  Farmers are more likely to invest a greater share of their personal assets in a 
new technique if they have a higher tolerance for risk, and if they interact frequently with their social 
network.  This finding is similar to Liu’s results from China, and stresses the need for future papers to 
include measures for risk preferences and social networks when attempting to analyze the decision to 
adopt a new technology.  
In the previous section we reviewed the main factors that contribute to risk aversion.  
Furthermore we have now established that risk aversion influences the extent to which farmers adopt.  
∂E[y | x]
∂x
∂E[y | x]
∂x
∂E[y | x]
∂x
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Considered together, these conclusions can be of good use to policy makers.  Firstly, policy makers now 
have reason to target the technology towards individuals who tend to have lower levels of risk aversion 
(Table 7). In the case at hand, those individuals have been identified as male, older and wealthier (Table 
5).   Secondly, our implementing partners can develop programs to target the factors that contribute to 
risk aversion.  For example, Table 5 illustrates that wealth levels influence risk preferences.  This means 
that programs that either increase household wealth or decrease the cost of the technology have a good 
chance at reducing farmers’ level of risk aversion.  From Table 7 we see that this can, in turn, increase the 
amount of land farmers will devote to the new technology. 
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Section VI: Conclusion 
In 2009 entomologists at Cornell University discovered a pesticide-free technology suitable for 
dealing with Colombia’s predominant potato pest, and wanted to know whether it would be feasible to 
implement it among local farmers.  The current study set out to determine which factors would most 
likely influence Colombian potato farmers’ decision to adopt such a technology, and the extent to which 
they would adopt.    More specifically, we hoped to address whether risk preferences would affect either 
one of these decisions.  
To this end, we led a two-month field experiment in order to collect measures for farmers’ 
willingness to adopt a new technology and the extent to which they would adopt.  We also gathered 
information on two potential barriers to adoption: the features of the new technologies and the individual 
characteristics of the farmer.  Firstly, we designed a choice experiment and a contingent valuation 
question to measure adoption and extent of adoption.  Secondly, we used a questionnaire and designed an 
experimental game to collect information on farmers’ personal characteristics and, more specifically, their 
risk preferences.   
We conducted this data collection process before diffusion took place.  This way, the information 
we collected could be passed on to both scientists and implementing partners alike.  The former could 
address prevailing issues with the technology’s design while the latter could tackle any social barriers to 
adoption.     
Our results can be summarized as follows.  Firstly, we find that only one of the two potential 
barriers to adoption significantly impacts the decision to adopt a new technology.   Indeed farmers place a 
lot of emphasis on the features of the technique.  They are much more likely to adopt the new technology 
if it provides higher yields, lower labor requirements and lower costs.  Moreover, farmers greatly value 
the health-related and environmental benefits of the technology as well.  More specifically, farmers are 
willing to make sacrifices in terms of the technology’s other attributes (yield, cost, and labor) if they can 
be sure that it will have fewer health impacts.  Conversely, farmers’ personal characteristics, and most 
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importantly their risk preferences, do not impact the decision to adopt.   This can potentially be attributed 
to the fact that the sample of farmers we were working with had already self-selected into FEDEPAPA, 
an association that emphasizes innovation and efficient farm management.  
The second main result concerns the extent to which farmers adopt a new technology.   Here we 
find that farmers’ personal characteristics do matter.  Indeed farmers that receive advice from others, and 
those who are more risk loving, are more likely to devote more of their land to the new technique.   
The paper makes two important contributions.  Firstly it highlights certain key barriers to adoption.  
As mentioned previously, the most important include the features of the technologies themselves.  Many 
of the ex-post studies tend to overlook the fact that the technology’s characteristics might not suit the 
farmers’ needs.   They begin with the assumption that the technology is optimal for farmers and then try 
to assess why adoption rates remain low.   Furthermore we find that the factors that influence the decision 
to adopt are not necessarily the same as those that motivate extent of adoption.  Indeed while risk 
preferences and social networks do not play a role in the decision to adopt, they do influence the number 
of hectares the farmer devotes to the new technique.    
Secondly this paper makes a contribution to policy, which is much harder for ex-post studies to do.  
The results we derive from this paper can now be transferred to the scientists and implementing partners 
involved in this project.  Both parties can use this information to ensure higher adoption rates.  On the one 
hand our results provide scientists with concrete evidence that their push pull technique will be well 
received by this group of farmers.  Indeed the new technology provides significant health benefits without 
demanding drastic increases in costs, labor or yield.   The scientists also now know that farmers are 
willing to make small sacrifices in terms of costs, yield and labor for the benefit of a healthier technique.  
However these sacrifices cannot be too large, as they will deter some farmers from adopting altogether, as 
well as reduce potential adopters enthusiasm for the technique.   
Implementing partners can also make valuable use of this information.   Specifically, policy 
makers can invest in risk coping mechanisms by providing subsidies for the new technology.   Moreover, 
they can actively recruit farmers to participate in groups like FEDEPAPA, which foster discussions with 
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other farmers and agronomists about best practices in potato farming.   Implementing partners can also 
use this information to try and diffuse the technology in the most efficient way possible.  The data 
supports the strategy of first introducing the technology to the most influential farmers in the community.  
This way they can be sure that more farmers will discuss the technique with the lead farmers.   
This transfer of knowledge illustrates the value of doing ex-ante studies when analyzing farmers’ 
willingness to adopt new technologies.  It encourages policy makers to try and understand the factors that 
will prevent farmers from adopting before actual diffusion takes place.  Funds can then be directed 
towards developing useful programs and that will ensure higher adoption rates among farmers, rather than 
towards costly programs that diffuse a technology, which does not appeal to the community.  There are 
only a handful of studies that try to assess farmers’ willingness to adopt before diffusion takes place.  
Moreover there are no papers, to this author’s knowledge, that use this ex-ante approach to assess the 
impact of risk preferences, on adoption decisions. 
There exist a number of other possibilities for future research.   Firstly, we could try to diffuse the 
technology in two potato growing regions within Colombia.  In one of these areas we could use our 
results from this ex-ante study to inform how diffusion should take place.  In the other region we could 
diffuse the technology without considering the results from this study.  The goal would then be to 
establish whether adoption rates are higher in the region where implementing partners considered the 
results from this ex-ante study.  Finally, it would be interesting to derive a model of ambiguity aversion 
and test whether or not this influences the decision to adopt a new technology.  This has only been done 
once before and merits further investigation.  	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Section VII: Appendix 
A. Appendix 1: Questionnaire (with Contingent Valuation Question at the end) 	  
REGISTRATION 
 
 
 
 
Interviewer #:    _ _ _                                         Date:  _ _  / _ _ 
                                                                                      Day / Month 
 
 
 
Time Started: _ _  / _ _                                      Time Ended: _ _  / _ _ 
                     Hour / Minute                                                    Hour / Minute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent Name:  _______________________________                    Respondent ID    _ _ _ _ _   
    
00. Head of Household 
01. Spouse of Head of Household 
02. Child of Head of Household 
03. Other Household Member 
 
HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD: 
is a person among the group of householders who is responsible for satisfying daily necessities of the household or a 
person who is regarded/assigned as the head of the household. 
 
HOUSEHOLDER: 
is anyone who usually lives in the household, whether she/he is at home during the survey or is temporarily absent. A 
householder who has been away for 6 or more months, and a householder who has been away for less than 6 
months but plans to move out/be away for 6 or more months is not regarded as a householder. A guest who has 
stayed in the household for 6 or more months or a guest who has stayed in the household for less than 6 months but 
plans to stay for 6 or more months is regarded as a householder. (The name of a householder is to be written on one 
line only.) 
 
 
Province:   ______________________ 
 
 
 
Municipality:  ____________________ 
 
 
 
Village:  _____________________ 
 
 
 
How many years have you lived in this municipality?   _______Years  
 
 
Do you plan on moving in the next 10 years?   Yes _____   No_____ 
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HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERSITICS 
 
 
0. What is your position in the household?  Head of Household ……………….…………………….01 
Son of Head of Household …………………………….02 
Wife of Head of Household ……………………………03 
Father of  Head of Household .………………………..04 
Other Family Member... ………………………………..05 
1. How many householders live under your roof 
(including yourself) 
 
 
__________ People 
2. How many are above 60 years of age?  
 
 
__________ People 
 
3. How many are below 6 years of age? 
 
 
__________ People 
 
4. How many are between 6 and 25 years of age?  
__________ People 
 
5. How many of those aged 6-25 went to school in the 
last year? 
 
 
__________ People 
 
6. How many of those aged 6-25 worked in the last year?  
__________ People 
 
7. Does your spouse earn income independently from 
you? 
Yes ….………………………………………………….01 
No ………………………………………………………02 
8. What is the size of your dwelling (square meters)    
_________ Square Meters 
9.  What type of material is used for the floors of your 
dwelling  
Tile………………………….……………………………01 
Brick/Cement …..………..……………………………..02 
Earth  ……………………………………………………03 
Wood …………………………………………………….04 
Other _____________________________________05 
 
 
9. How old are you?   
_________  Years   
 
10. What is your gender (interviewer can 
complete this on his or her own) 
Female …………..01  
Male ……………..02 
11. What is your highest level of education?   
 
 
No Primary Education …………………………………01 
Primary  …………………………………………..……..02 
High School (Academic)……………………………….03  
High School (Technical) ………………………..…….04 
Vocational College ……………………………………05 
Undergraduate  ……………………………………….06 
Master’s/ Doctorate ………………..…………………07  
11. What is the highest level of education of your 
children?   
 
 
No Primary Education …………………………………01 
Primary  …………………………………………..……..02 
High School (Academic)……………………………….03  
High School (Technical) ………………………..…….04 
Vocational College ……………………………………05 
Undergraduate  ……………………………………….06 
Master’s/ Doctorate ………………..…………………07  
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HEALTH 
 
In general, how is your health? Very healthy ..................01  
Somewhat healthy ….... 02 
Somewhat unhealthy…..03  
Unhealthy ......................04 
During the last 4 weeks, how many days of your 
primarily daily activities did you miss due to poor 
health? 
 
_____________ days 
In the last 4 years have you experienced any serious 
health problems (requiring hospitalization)? 
Yes ………………….… 01 
No  ……………………. 02 
4. Have you or a member of the household 
experienced one of the following illnesses?  
 
Frequent Headaches/ Fevers………....…01 
Nausea/vomiting  ……..…………………..02 
Difficulty breathing…………………………03 
Skin infection ………………………………04 
Cancer ……………………………………..05 
Complications in Pregnancy …………...06 
5. How often do you suffer from these illnesses? 
 
 
Rarely …………………………..….……..01 
Occasionally   …………..………………..02 
Frequently………………….……………..03 
 
 
Now we would like to ask about health and pesticides  
Do you think pesticides greatly harm your health?  Strongly Agree ……………...01 
Moderately Agree …………..02 
Agree ………………………...03 
Disagree ……………………..04 
Strongly Disagree……….…..05 
Where do you keep the pesticides?  In the kitchen …………..…...01 
In the home ……..................02 
Outside  ……........................03 
Which of the following elements do you use to 
protect yourself from pesticides? 
 
Gloves ……………………….01 
Mask (Cloth).………………..02 
Coveralls…………………….03 
Glasses …………………......04 
Boots…………………………05 
Mask (Industrial)…………….06 
From where do you get your drinking water? Private Piped water into dwelling ………………...01 
Private Piped water into compound/plot…………02 
Community piped water (public tap) …………….03 
Water vendor……………………………………….04 
Neighboring household…………………………...05 
Bottled water……………………………………….06 
River, lake, spring, pond………………………….07 
Rain catchment tank………………………………08 
Other………………………………………………..09 
 
Do you take extra precautions to treat your water? 
 
Yes ……………………… 01  à Skip 
No  ………………………. 02 ↓ Next Question 
What degree of importance do you attach to the 
presence of clean water/air environment? 
Very Low ………………..01 
Low ……………………...02 
Average …………………03 
High ……………………..04 
Very High ………………05 
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FARM CHARACTERISTICS 
 
How many years have you been farming? 
 
_______________   Years 
What is the ownership status of your farm? 
 
Own it alone …………….………01 ↓ Next Question 
Rent it only ………………....…. 02   
Own it in a partnership…...……03   
Own and rent…………………...04   
Estimate the size of the farm in square meters  _______________  Square meters   
 
 
Now we would like to ask you about what you produce: 
Crops  1 2 3 
Mention at most three 
main crops grown by this 
household (which includes 
different varieties of the 
same crop) 
    
What is the average yield 
of this crop? 
 
________ tons/ hectare 
 
________ tons/ hectare 
 
 
________ tons/ hectare 
 
What percentage of your 
land do you allocate to this 
crop 
 
_______________ % 
 
_______________ % 
 
_______________ % 
 
Do you own livestock?  
 
Yes ………………………..01 
No  ……...…………………02 
How much income did you earn from your 
livestock? 
 Quantity Price Months   Annual Value 
Milk  
 
   
Eggs  
 
   
Meat      
 
What percentage of your land do you allocate to raising these animals?  
_____________  Hectares 
 
Are you planning to allocate more land to livestock over crops in the 
future    
 
Yes ………………….01 
No ……………………02 
 
 
Now we would like to ask you about your growing practices: 
How many times in a cropping season do you spray 
your field with insecticide to control for the Guatemalan 
Potato Moth? 
 
_______________________ Sprays/ Cropping Season 
 
How many times a month do you apply fungicide to 
your fields? 
 
________________________Applications/ Month	  
 
Do you apply different amounts of pesticide for 
different crop varieties?  
Yes ................................................01 
No.  ............................................... 02 
Do you use organic fertilizer?  Yes ................................................01 
No.  ............................................... 02 
Do you use chemical fertilizer?  Yes ................................................01 
No.  ............................................... 02 
Do you have an irrigation system? Yes ................................................01 
No.  ............................................... 02 
Why did you choose to use these specific types of 
pesticide / herbicide / fungicide? 
Advice of agricultural officer?  ………………01 
Advice of crop buyer? ……………………….02 
Received for free? ……………………………03 
Cheap …………………………………………04 
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Own Experience/ Works best……………….05 
Neighbor Advice ……………………………..06 
Other: _______________________  ……..07 
Where did you buy most of pesticide / herbicide / 
fungicide? 
Private Distributor in the Village…………..01 
Cooperative/ Farmer’s association……….02 
Relative/ Friend …………………………….03 
Neighbor/ Fellow Farmer  ………..………..04 
How do you deal with the pests that attack your crops 
during a relatively bad year? 
Increase Pesticide Use……………..01 
Maintain similar practices ………….02 
Decrease Pesticide Use …………...03 
Change methods altogether ……….04 
Other …………………………………05 
 
 
 
Now we would like to ask about selling practices: 
How much did you sell in the last harvest? 
 
 
______________________ tons/ hectare 
What is the market price of the most recent harvest?  
______________________ pesos 
What was total revenue from the most recent 
harvest (without discounting costs) 
 
______________________pesos  
On average, what percentage of the potatoes grown 
was damaged and could not be sold? 
 
______________________% 
How many workers do you employ on your farm  
______________________workers 
 
 
Now we would like to know about your exposure to IPM: 
Have you heard of Integrated Pest Management 
Strategies (IPM)? 
Yes ………………………….. 01  ↓ Next 
No  ………………………….. 02  à Skip 
Have you attended any seminars/ conferences/ talks 
on IPM? 
Yes ………………………….. 01  ↓ Next 
No  ………………………….. 02   
Have you adopted any IPM strategies 
Circle all that apply 
Zero Pesticide Use………………….….............01 
Good soil preparation …………………………. 02    
Deep planting  …………………………………. 03   
High row cultivation………...............................04  
Timing of harvest…………..……………………05  
Management of crop residues  …....................06 
Use of sexual pheromone traps ……………....07  
Cleaning and disinfection of storage site …….08 
Use of baculovirus as inoculant ……………….09 
Do you believe that a natural spray (which doesn’t 
use pesticides) can be as effective at killing pests? 
Yes ………………………….. 01  ↓ Next 
No  ………………………….. 02  à Skip 
I am willing to take risks with new technologies 
before I see good results in other farms 
Strongly Agree ……………...01 
Moderately Agree …………..02 
Agree ………………………...03 
Disagree ……………………..04 
Strongly Disagree…………..05 
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HOUSEHOLD INCOME/ SAVINGS/ CREDIT AND INSURANCE 
 
We would now like to ask about your Income 
 
Approximately how much net profit did you gain last 
year from farming, after taking out all your business 
expenses? 
 
 
_______________________ Pesos 
What was your total household income from 
sources such as government programs (subsidies), 
support from FEDEPAPA 
 
______________________ Pesos 
What was the total household revenue in the past 
year from all sources including farming, 
government programs, part time labor, livestock, and 
remittances (best guess) 
 
_______________________ Pesos 
Do you have a secondary occupation? Yes ………………... 01 
No …………………. 02 
Have you searched for work off the farm? 
 
Yes ………………... 01 
No …………………. 02 
Approximately, what percentage of your total 
revenue comes from your farming activities?  
 
 
_______________________ % 
 
 
Now we would like to ask you about major expenses 
How much do you spend on average on food per month? 
 
 
__________________Pesos 
How much do you spend on average per month on school/ education? 
 
 
__________________Pesos 
How much do you spend on average per month on transportation? 
 
 
__________________Pesos 
How much do you spend on average per month on public services? 
 
 
__________________Pesos 
How much do you spend on average per month on household items? 
 
 
__________________Pesos 
How much do you spend on average per month on leisure? 
 
 
__________________Pesos 
How much do you spend on average per month on taxes? 
 
 
__________________Pesos 
How much do you spend on average per month on medicine? 
 
 
__________________Pesos 
How much do you spend on average per month on other items? 
 
 
__________________Pesos 
How much do you spend in total per month and year 
 
 
____________ Pesos/ Month 
 
____________Pesos/ Year 
 
Now we would like to ask you about your savings 
How much do you save on average 
per year? 
 
 
________________________ pesos 
 
How do you save your money?  In a piggy bank …………………………………….01 
In a formal bank ……………………………………02 
Invest in livestock …………………………………03 
Invest in other …………………………………...…04 
What do you save for primarily?  
 
To buy or renovate a house ……….….………..………….01 
To buy land ……………………………,………………..…..02  
To buy livestock ……………………………………….........03 
To protect oneself against unpredictable crop loss ……..04 
To invest in new machinery ………………………………..05 
To invest in new technologies ………..……………………06 
92	  
To invest in a new business ……………………………….07 
To pay ones loans …………………………………………..08     
To send ones children to University .................................09 
To travel/spend on leisure  …………………………………10 
To pay for religious ceremonies………………………........11 
To take care of ones parent………………………………...12    
I do not have anything to save for ………………………....13 
Other…………………………………………………………...14 
 
We would like to know about your credit access and history  
How much credit/ loans were you given by friends, 
family and financial institutions in the last five years? 
 
_______________________ Pesos 
Do you have any outstanding debt?  Yes ……………………………01  
No ……………………………..02 
Will you be able to pay back your loan in a timely 
fashion?  
Yes ……………………………01  
No ……………………………..02 
How often do you take out loans? Every 6 months …………………………………..01 
Every year  ………………………………………..02 
Every 5 years  …………………………………….03 
Almost never ………………………………………04 
In your opinion, are financial institutions willing to 
loan you money?  
Yes ……………………………………...……………01  
No ………………………………………………..…..02 
I never take loans from financial institutions……..03 
Have you ever been denied a loan by the 
Government, bank or other financial institutions?   
 
Yes ………………………….. 01  ↓ Next 
No  ………………………….. 02  à Skip 
What are the major reasons you were denied credit Insufficient collateral ………………………………...01 
Main source of income has too much price risk ….02 
I have failed to repay a loan in the past……………03  
Bank does not believe I am trustworthy……………04 
The repayment schedule required by the bank 
lender does not match the timing of sales from my 
small business ………………………………………05 
 
Is there a period in the year where you are 
financially constrained?  
Yes ……………………………01 ↓ Next 
No ……………………………..02 à Skip 
In which period of the year are you financially 
constrained?  
 
 
 Planting Maintenance Harvest 
1 cycle 
 
   
2 cycle 
 
   
Observations:   
 
 
Now we would like to ask about insurance  
 
Do you have access to insurance?  Yes ………………………….. 01  ↓ Next 
No  ………………………….. 02  à Skip 
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HOUSEHOLD ASSETS 
 
Type of 
Assets 
Do you or does any other 
member of the household own 
[…]? 
What is the total value of 
[…] (including renting) 
How many years 
have you had […] 
Do you owe any 
money for the 
purchase of […] 
House and 
Land 
01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
Livestock 01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
Cars 01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
Motorbikes 01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
Bicycles  01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
TV 01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
Radio 01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
Washer 01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
Fridge 01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
Computer/ 
Camera  
01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
Tractor 01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
 
 Heavy 
equipment’s 
(like farming 
machines, 
generator, 
etc.) 
01. Yes ------> 
02. No ↓ 
Next Line 
 
 
__________ Pesos 
0-5   years   ….01 
5-10 years   …..02 
10-15 years   ...03 
15-20 years  ….04 
Entire Life……..05 
Yes ………….. 01 
No……………. 02 
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HOUSEHOLD SHOCK 
 
Has this household gone through one of 
the following shocks within the past 5 
years? 
Crop Loss ……………………………………..……………………………..01                       
Increased Input Prices (chemicals, fertilizer…)…………….……...…….02 
Increased Labor Costs………………………………..…………...……….03 
Decrease in the Price of Potatoes …..………………….........................04 
Job Loss ………………………………..……...……………....….………...05 
Death of a family member ………………………………..….…………….06 
Sickness of a householder that required hospitalization or continuous 
medical treatment ……………………………………….………………….07 
Extreme Weather Events, ……………………………………..……...…..08 
Has this household gone through one of 
the following shocks within the past 12 
months? 
Crop Loss ……………………………………..……………………………..01                       
Increased Input Prices (chemicals, fertilizer…)…………….……...…….02 
Increased Labor Costs………………………………..…………...……….03 
Decrease in the Price of Potatoes …..………………….........................04 
Job Loss ………………………………..……...……………....….………...05 
Death of a family member ………………………………..….…………….06 
Sickness of a householder that required hospitalization or continuous 
medical treatment ……………………………………….………………….07 
Extreme Weather Events, ……………………………………..……...…..08 
Please indicate which two of these 
economic shocks were most severely felt 
by your household 
 
______________(code)      _____________(code) 
Most important                       Second most important 
What steps have been taken by 
household members in response to 
these difficulties (circle all that apply) 
00.  Adapt 
01. Use Savings  
02. Change Crop/ Land use 
03. Change Agricultural Practices  
04. Plant less Potato Seeds  
05. Sell Land/ Possession 
06. Consume Less 
07. Take out a loan 
08. Reduce Spending 
09. Receive outside 
assistance 
10. Reduce hired labor 
11. Take an additional job 
12.  Other ____ 
Which groups/ organizations do you rely 
on to help cope with these risks 
00.  None  
01.  Farmers Association/ Cooperative 
02.  NGO 
03.  Government 
04.  Family 
05.  Friend 
06.  Businessman  
07.  Other _____ 
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INFORMATION DISSEMINATION  
 
 Do you, or one of your family 
members, engage in […] 
How often do you, or one of your family members,  engage 
in […] 
 
Reading the 
newspaper 
01. Yes ---------------------> 
02. No  ↓Next 
Every day …………………..…..…….01 
Once a week………………………….02 
Once a month ………………………..03 
Once a year………………..…………04  
Listening to the radio 01. Yes ---------------------> 
02. No  ↓Next  
Every day …………………..…..…….01 
Once a week………………………….02 
Once a month ………………………..03 
Once a year………………..…………04 
Surf the internet 01. Yes ---------------------> 
02. No  ↓Next  
Every day …………………..…..…….01 
Once a week………………………….02 
Once a month ………………………..03 
Once a year………………..…………04 
Watching TV 01. Yes ---------------------> 
02. No  ↓Next  
Every day …………………..…..…….01 
Once a week………………………….02 
Once a month ………………………..03 
Once a year………………..…………04 
Do you consider yourself to be well informed about the 
daily events in your community or region? 
 
Strongly Disagree ………………………...01 
Disagree …………………………….……....02 
Neutral………………………………………..03 
Agree ………………………………………...04 
Strongly Agree …………………………….05 
Which individuals are most influential in the 
community? 
 
Religious Leader…….………………………..01 
Mayor ……………………………………........02 
Community Member………………………….03 
Extension Agent……………………….......…04 
Other…………………………………………...05 
How often do you discuss farming techniques with 
fellow potato growers?  
All the time ….………………………..01 
Often…………………………………..02 
Occasionally……………………………03 
Rarely …………….. ………………....04 
Never…..………………………………05 
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Information 
Source 
Did you receive 
advice for your 
agricultural 
activities from any 
of the following 
sources in 
the last 6 months? 
How many times did 
you or any other 
member of your 
household visit or 
meet with 
[SOURCE] in the 
last 6 months  
 
Have you put 
any of the 
information/ 
advice from 
[SOURCE] into 
practice? 
 
How would you rate the 
information/ advice 
received? 
 
FEDEPAPA, or 
another 
farmers 
association  
Yes  ----------> 
 
No ↓Next 
Every Day  ….01 
Every Week ...02 
Every Month…03  
Every 6 Months...04 
Yes  ----------> 
 
No ↓Next 
Very Useful ………..01 
Somewhat Useful…02 
Not Very Useful……03 
Not Useful………….04 
Other……………….05 
Umata Yes  ----------> 
 
No ↓Next 
Every Day  ….01 
Every Week ...02 
Every Month…03  
Every 6 Months...04 
Yes  ----------> 
 
No ↓Next 
Very Useful ………..01 
Somewhat Useful…02 
Not Very Useful……03 
Not Useful………….04 
Other……………….05 
NGO/Research 
organization 
Yes  ----------> 
 
No ↓Next 
Every Day  ….01 
Every Week ...02 
Every Month…03  
Every 6 Months...04 
Yes  ----------> 
 
No ↓Next 
Very Useful ………..01 
Somewhat Useful…02 
Not Very Useful……03 
Not Useful………….04 
Other……………….05 
Private 
Company  
Yes  ----------> 
 
No ↓Next 
Every Day  ….01 
Every Week ...02 
Every Month…03  
Every 6 Months...04 
Yes  ----------> 
 
No ↓Next 
Very Useful ………..01 
Somewhat Useful…02 
Not Very Useful……03 
Not Useful………….04 
Other……………….05 
Peer Farmer 
(Neighbor/ 
Relative) 
Yes  ----------> 
 
No ↓Next 
Every Day  ….01 
Every Week ...02 
Every Month…03  
Every 6 Months...04 
Yes  ----------> 
 
No ↓Next 
Very Useful ………..01 
Somewhat Useful…02 
Not Very Useful……03 
Not Useful………….04 
Other……………….05 
 
 
 
 
 
Have you participated in an agricultural project, run 
by an NGO and/or a research organization, before? 
 
Yes ………………………. 01 
No ………………………..  02 
What year was the last project that you took part in?  
_____________________ Year 
 
Have you ever rented your land for agricultural 
projects related to IPM? 
 
Yes ………………………. 01 
No ………………………..  02 
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Finally we would like to know how much money you would be willing to accept to participate in a future 
Cornell study run by a team of University biologists.  This would require renting one quarter of a hectare of 
your fields to the team, who would like to use the land to test the effectiveness of a new pesticide free 
technology. The team will cover all the expenses associated with the experiment, including all necessary 
materials and labor costs.  
 
The team has already run this experiment with 15 other farms in the region, and they would like to do it again 
with more farmers in different regions.  The price that they will be able to pay will stay between 400,000 and 
600,000 pesos for a quarter of a hectare  
 
 
1. Would you be willing to rent a quarter of a hectare of your land to the researchers from Cornell University for one 
cropping season at 400,000 pesos?  
Si  à STOP and skip to Question 3 
No à Continue with Question 2 
2. Would you be willing to rent a quarter of a hectare of your land to the researchers from Cornell University for one 
cropping season at 600,000 pesos  
Si à Continue with Question 3.  
No à END OF SURVEY 
 
 
3. At the chosen price, how many acres of your land would you be willing to rent to the researchers from Cornell? 
(they only require ¼ of a hectare but they can always rent more land if its available )?  
______ hectáreas  
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B. Appendix 2: Choice Experiment  	  
1.   DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)  Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 270 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor Less labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 450,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
High Probability of 
Developing an Illness  
I select:   
 
 
 
 
 
2.  DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 300 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor More labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 375,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
3. DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 240 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor Same amount of labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 350,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
  
99	  
 
4. DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 300 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor Same amount of labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 375,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
Low Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
5.  DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 240 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements  Same amount of labor More labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 375,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
6.   DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 240 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  More labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 450,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
Low Probability of 
Developing an Illness  
I select:   
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7.  DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 300 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  Less labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 450,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
 
8.  DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 270 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  Less labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 375,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness  
Low Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
9.  DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 240 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  Less labor   
Costs 375,000 pesos 350,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
Low Probability of 
Developing an Illness  
I select:   
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10. DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 270 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor More labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 450,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
Low Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
11.  DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 240 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  Same amount of labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 450,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
Low Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
12.  DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 270 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor Same amount of labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 375,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
Low Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
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13.   DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas /ha 270 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  More labor   
Costs 375,000 pesos 350,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
 
14.  DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 300 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  Less labor    
Costs 375,000 pesos 350,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
Low Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
15.  DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 270 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor Same amount of labor   
Costs 375,000 pesos 350,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
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16. DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 300 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  Same amount of labor   
Costs 375,000 pesos 450,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
 
17. DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 300 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  More labor   
Costs 375,000 pesos 350,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
Low Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
 
 
 
 
18. DO YOU WANT TO SWITCH? 
  Technology A (Status quo)   Technology B (Alternative) 
Average Yield 270 cargas/ha 240 cargas/ha 
Labor Requirements Same amount of labor  Less labor  
Costs 375,000 pesos 375,000 pesos 
Health/Environment High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
High Probability of 
Developing an Illness 
I select:   
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C. Appendix 3: Risk Game  	  
Serie 1 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
1  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
15,600 for ball 1 
1,147 for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
2  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
17,205 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
3  9,176 for balls 1,2,3 
2,294 for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
19,041 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
4  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
21,335 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
5  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
24,317 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
6  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
28,676 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
7  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
34,411 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
8  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
42,411 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
9  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
50,470 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
10  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
68,823 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
11  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
91,764 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
12 9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
137,647 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
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13 9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
229,411 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
14  9,176  for balls 1,2,3 
2,294  for balls 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
390,000 for ball 1 
1,147  for balls 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
 
 
Serie 2 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
15  9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
12,388 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147 for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
16  9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
12,847 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147 for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
17 9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
13,305 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147  for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
18 9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
13,764 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147  for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
19  9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
14,223 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147 for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
20  9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
14,911 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147  for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
21  9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
15,600 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147  for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
22  9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
16,517 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147 for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
23 9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
17,664 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147 for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
24  9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
19,041 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147 for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
25  9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
20,647 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147 for balls 8,9,10 
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 Plan A Plan B 
26 9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
22,941 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147 for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
27 9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
25,235 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147 for balls 8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
28 9,176 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
6,682 for balls 10 
29,823 for balls 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
1,147 for balls 8,9,10 
 
 
Serie 3 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
29  5,735 for balls  1,2,3,4,5 
-917 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
6,882 for balls  1,2,3,4,5 
-4,817 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
30  917 for balls  1,2,3,4,5 
-917 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
6,882 for balls  1,2,3,4,5 
-4,817 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
31  229 for balls  1,2,3,4,5 
-917 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
6,882 for balls  1,2,3,4,5 
-4,817 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
32 229 for balls     1,2,3,4,5 
-1,835 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
6,882 for balls 1,2,3,4,5 
-3,670 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
33 229 for balls     1,2,3,4,5 
-1,835 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
6,882 for balls  1,2,3,4,5 
-3,670 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
34 229 for balls      1,2,3,4,5 
-1,835 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
6,882 for balls 1,2,3,4,5 
-3,211 for balls  6,7,8,9,10 
 
 Plan A Plan B 
35 229 for balls     1,2,3, 4,5 
-1,835 for balls 6,7,8,9,10 
6,882 for balls 1,2,3,4,5 
-2,523 for balls  6,7,8,9,10 
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